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Yoshino: Reevaluating the Equal Pay Act for the Modern Professional Woman

REEVALUATING THE EQUAL PAY ACT FOR
THE MODERN PROFESSIONAL WOMAN
“It’s the Fred Astaire-Ginger Rogers thing . . . Women do the
same steps as men, but they do them backwards and in high
heels.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
Mika Brzezinski, co-host of MSNBC’s Morning Joe, was underpaid,
overworked, and undervalued.2 Despite her professional experience,
long hours, and success at creating a hit show, MSNBC refused to pay
her what she was worth.3 In Brzezinksi’s recent bestseller Knowing Your
Value, she explains her inability to be properly compensated was a result
of not knowing her value and not knowing how to ask for what she
deserved.4 In her book, she explores the problem of wage disparity at
the professional level and the lack of women in leadership positions.5
Currently, three percent of Forbes 500 chief executive officers are
women.6 Of the one hundred U.S. Senators, only seventeen are women.7

See MIKA BRZEZINKSI, KNOWING YOUR VALUE: WOMEN, MONEY, AND GETTING WHAT
YOU’RE WORTH 64 (2010) (quoting Ilene H. Lang, president and CEO of Catalyst) (“That’s
what women have to go through to show they’re as good as men. They have to work
harder, they take much longer to be promoted, and they have to prove themselves over and
over again.”); see also Bob Thaves & Tom Thames, Comic Strip, Frank and Ernest,
THECOMICSTRIPS.COM (May 3, 1982), http://thecomicstrips.com/store/add_strip.php?
iid=69155 (“Sure he was great, but don’t forget that Ginger Rogers did everything he did,
backwards and in high heels.”).
2
See BRZEZINKSI, supra note 1, at 2 (explaining her twenty-year career as a professional
journalist, fifteen-hour work days, only to be paid 1/14 of what her co-host was making).
3
Id. Brzezinski acknowledges that her co-host Joe Scarborough, a former congressman,
was worth more to the show’s success, and “his salary was on par with other prime time
hosts,” but she questioned whether he was fourteen times more valuable than her. Id. at 2–
3. Scarborough was just as upset with MSNBC for not paying Brzezinski more and went so
far as to transfer his rating bonuses into her account. Id. at 140–41. She credits her co-host
for knowing her value better than she did. Id. at 144. Brzezinski was eventually
compensated for her worth with a book deal, radio show, and other business opportunities.
Id.
4
Id. at 186.
5
Id. at 51–52.
6
See THE WHITE HOUSE PROJECT, THE WHITE HOUSE PROJECT REPORT: BENCHMARKING
WOMEN’S LEADERSHIP 10 (Nov. 2009), available at http://thewhitehouseproject.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/03/benchmark_wom_leadership.pdf (explaining the breakdown of
women in business leadership positions). Companies with greater female participation in
management do better financially than those with fewer women in leadership. Id. at 27.
Dina Dublon, member of the boards of directors for Microsoft, Accenture, and PepsiCo.
states, “Diversity in leadership and openness to new perspectives is crucial for charting the
course in business. Without more than symbolic representation, we risk going backward
instead of forward.” Id. See also SHERYL SANDBERG, LEAN IN: WOMEN, WORK, AND THE
1
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Women, on average, hold only eighteen percent of top leadership
positions in industries like academia, law, film, and journalism.8
Although the Bureau of Labor Statistics (“BLS”) reported women’s
participation in the labor force has grown substantially over the past
century, the glass ceiling remains.9 Women are making progress in

WILL TO LEAD 8 (2013) (asserting that while societal barriers continue, women have put up
barriers within themselves).
We hold ourselves back in ways both big and small, by lacking selfconfidence, by not raising our hands, and by pulling back when we
should be leaning in. We internalize the negative messages we get
throughout our lives—the messages that say it’s wrong to be
outspoken, aggressive, more powerful than men. We lower our own
expectations of what we can achieve. We continue to do the majority
of the housework and childcare. We compromise our career goals to
make room for partners and children who may not even exist yet.
Compared to our male colleagues, fewer of us aspire to senior
positions . . . . My argument is that getting rid of these internal barriers
is critical to gaining power.
Id. Sandberg is a wife, mother of two, and currently serves as the chief operating officer of
Facebook.
7
See Women in the Senate, UNITED STATES SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/
artandhistory/history/common/briefing/women_senators.htm (last visited Aug. 13, 2012)
(discussing women’s involvement in the Senate). Only thirty-nine women have served in
the U.S. Senate. Id.
8
See THE WHITE HOUSE PROJECT, supra note 6, at 9 (exploring the percentage of female
leadership in ten sectors). The report concludes that in order to make lasting change,
women need to reach “critical mass” in various industries. Id. at 14. Critical mass,
originating from nuclear physics, refers to the “quantity needed to start a chain reaction, an
irreversible propulsion into a new situation or process.” Id. By reaching critical mass
women would not be seen as women, but as equals. Id. at 13. Critical mass is achieved
with one-third representation. Id. at 5. Referencing the Supreme Court, “[O]ne woman is
newsworthy—she’s a first. Two is better—but still an exception, not the rule. Three out of
nine—one in three—stops being unusual.” Id. at 14. See also Sandberg, supra note 6, at 15–
16 (arguing that while women possess the skills to lead in the workplace, they lack the
ambition to achieve senior positions). Sandberg notes female accomplishments come at a
cost, “Professional ambition is expected of men . . . . Aggressive and hard-charging women
violate unwritten rules about acceptable social conduct. Men are continually applauded
for being ambitious and powerful and successful, but women who display these same traits
often pay the social penalty.” Id. at 17. Many disagree with Sandberg claiming, “Women
are not less ambitious than men . . . [just] more enlightened with different and more
meaningful goals.” Id. at 18. Sandberg recognizes not all women want careers, children, or
both and appreciates there is more to life than climbing the career ladder. Id. at 10, 18.
9
U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, BLS SPOTLIGHT ON STATISTICS: WOMEN AT WORK 1
(Mar. 2011), available at http://www.bls.gov/spotlight/2011/women/pdf/women_bls_
spotlight.pdf; see C. KERRY FIELDS & HENRY R. CHEESEMAN, CONTEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT
LAW 245 (2011) (explaining that a glass-ceiling is a perceived barrier preventing certain
classes of individuals from climbing the “highest rungs of corporate leadership”).
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white-collar professions, such as medical, legal, and executive positions;
however, they are paid less than their male counterparts.10
On average, women are paid eighty-one percent of men’s salaries for
similar work.11 Although this is a substantial increase from the fifty-nine
percent women received in 1963, women are still paid less in every
profession.12 Careful examinations of industry pay practices reveal that
the wage gap exists in lower-wage occupational jobs, but the women
who are better educated and have achieved the highest levels of
professional status experience a more substantial pay gap.13 These
professional women stand to lose the most over a forty-year career.14 For
example, it has been estimated that female health care practitioners will
See JESSICA ARONS, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS ACTION FUND, LIFETIME LOSSES:
THE CAREER WAGE GAP 5 (Dec. 2008), available at http://www.americanprogressaction.
org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2008/pdf/equal_pay.pdf (explaining the history of
gender wage disparity).
11
See U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 9, at 7 (reporting that as of 2010
women now earn eighty-one percent of what men earn).
12
See ARONS, supra note 10, at 2–5 (explaining the history of the wage disparity and
current pay differentials); see also Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, Shattering the Equal Pay
Act’s Glass Ceiling, 63 SMU L. REV. 17, 29 (2010) (illustrating the double standard pay scales
in the 1960s).
13
See ARONS, supra note 10, at 5 (examining the wage disparity in different professions);
AM. ASS’N FOR UNIV. WOMEN, THE SIMPLE TRUTH ABOUT THE GENDER PAY GAP 15 (2011),
available at http://www.aauw.org/learn/research/upload/simpletruthaboutpaygap1.pdf
(showing occupation segregation and subsequent pay inequity within those fields). The
pay gap is greater with higher levels of education. Id. at 13. See also Eisenberg, supra note
12, at 24, 26 (asserting that professional and executive women “are not earning
compensation levels comparable to their male peers”); see also JOAN C. WILLIAMS & VETA T.
RICHARDSON, NEW MILLENNIUM, SAME GLASS CEILING? THE IMPACT OF LAW FIRM
COMPENSATION
SYSTEMS
ON
WOMEN
9
(July
2010),
available
at
http://www.attorneyretention.org/Publications/SameGlassCeiling.pdf
(“Professional
women have the largest gender wage gap in the entire economy: they earn proportionately
less, as compared with professional men than do women in non-professional jobs.”)
(footnote omitted); JUDY GOLDBERG DEY & CATHERINE HILL, AAUW EDUC. FOUND., BEHIND
THE PAY GAP 11 (2007), available at http://www.aauw.org/learn/research/upload/
behindpaygap.pdf (studying the pay gap after college). The study reported that full time
female workers that are one year out of college earned eighty percent of what their fellow
male classmates earned. Id. at 10. Women earned less than men in nearly every collegiate
major, but the extent of the discrepancy is dependent on the major. Id. at 11. After taking
into account segregation by major and then subsequent occupation choices, five percent of
that pay differential cannot be explained and may be attributed to sex discrimination. Id. at
8. Ten years out of college that unexplained five percent grows to twelve percent. Id. at 20.
14
See ARONS, supra note 10, at 5 (analyzing the wage disparity in different types of
employment). Women may average a loss of $434,000 over forty years. Id. at 1. According
to the Center for American Progress, the reason for the drastic difference in professional
pay is that skilled labor tends to be more unionized with set salary ranges, and these union
contracts do not provide opportunities for salary negotiation. Id. at 6. Women with college
degrees faired far worse than those without—$713,000 versus $270,000 for women who did
not finish high school. Id. at 1.
10
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lose $891,000 in their career, while females in the legal profession will
lose $1,481,000.15
Brzezinski interviewed prominent women in various industries
about knowing their value in the workplace, including Valarie Jarrett,
senior advisor to President Obama; Sheryl Sandberg, Chief Operating
Officer (“COO”) of Facebook; and Arianna Huffington, media
entrepreneur.16 Brzezinski found many of the women she interviewed
shared the similar struggle of getting paid their value.17 She suggests
women learn from her own experiences and those of her interviewees
and take matters into their own hands by realizing their value and
asking for what they are worth.18 However, if asking does not work and
the wage difference for similar work continues, women should seek legal
remedies.19
Current legal solutions for a professional woman are to either file a
claim in court pursuant to the Equal Pay Act (“EPA”) or Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”); file a complaint with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”); or all of the above.20
The current U.S. approach to wage disparity is considered a complaintbased model because it relies solely on the individual to file a claim.21 The
15
Id. at 5. The top five occupations where women stand to lose out are legal, health care
practitioners, sales, management, and business operations. Id. at 6. See NAT’L ASS’N OF
WOMEN LAWYERS & NAWL FOUND., REPORT OF THE THIRD ANNUAL NATIONAL SURVEY ON
RETENTION AND PROMOTION OF WOMEN IN LAW FIRMS 3 (Nov. 2008), available at
http://nawl.timberlakepublishing.com/files/2008_Survey_Report_FINAL_as%20of%2011
-10-08.pdf (“At every stage of practice, men out-earn women lawyers . . . .”). In the 2008
survey, the National Association of Women Lawyers (“NAWL”) found that “at each level
of seniority, women in large firms do less well than men,” and the difference increases as
women advance in their career. Id. at 14. Associate women earn ninety-seven percent of
their male counterparts and if/when women make equity partner that percentage drops to
eighty-seven percent. Id. Furthermore, women make up less than sixteen percent of equity
partners. Id. at 2.
16
BRZEZINSKI, supra note 1, at 6–8. Brzezinski found that women did not ask for a higher
salary because either they were unaware they should be paid more; afraid of raising their
hand and being rejected; interested in being liked; or under the belief that if they work hard
enough and long enough, they will be given what they deserve. Id. at 37, 40, 42, 85, 132.
17
Id. at 8.
18
Id. at 8, 184. Brzezinski explains value is not just about money but understanding how
you should be valued anywhere. Id. at 8. But she encourages the reader to know the fairmarket-value of their contributions so they can be paid what they deserve. Id. at 186.
19
See infra text accompanying note 20 (explaining EPA, Title VII, and EEOC as viable
legal options to remedy unequal wages based on sex).
20
See Equal Pay/Compensation Discrimination, EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N,
http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/equalcompensation.cfm (last visited Sept. 28, 2011)
(discussing how individuals may seek a remedy under the EPA).
21
See PAY EQUITY TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, PAY EQUITY: A NEW APPROACH TO A
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT 111 (2004) (noting complaint-based models require complaints to
initiate a pay equity review).
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individual’s prima facie standard is difficult to meet, and the affirmative
defenses are so broadly construed that most claims are dismissed at
summary judgment.22 District courts, from 1999–2009, granted summary
judgment motions in favor of employers seventy-two percent of the time
and these judgments were affirmed by an appellate court ninety-two
percent of the time.23 Complaint-based models are recognized as
inadequate because employers are unlikely to change their practices
until faced with a complaint or individual claim.24
Discriminatory pay practices are not limited to the United States,
and, consequently, other countries have adopted diverse approaches to
addressing this endemic problem.25 According to the International
Labor Organization (“ILO”), Sweden and Canada have adopted the best
approach—the proactive model.26 This model is the most effective
approach because it places responsibility on the employers to review
their pay practices, adopt a pay equity action plan to remedy pay
discrepancies, and comply within a certain timeframe.27 This Note
proposes an amendment to the EPA that incorporates similar proactive
model responsibilities on U.S. employers.
In an effort to amend the EPA to follow a proactive model, Part II of
this Note discusses the remedies for addressing the wage disparity,
acknowledges contemporary congressional legislation to ameliorate the
deficiencies of the EPA, and introduces the proactive model.28 Part III of
this Note addresses the problems associated with relying solely on the
EPA’s complaint-based model and analyzes Canada and Sweden’s

22
See Eisenberg, supra note 12, at 33 (noting that an increasing number of claims are
dismissed at summary judgment).
23
Id. at 34.
24
See EQUAL PAY TASK FORCE, JUST PAY: A REPORT TO THE EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES
COMMISSION, xi (2001), available at http://www4.btwebworld.com/equalpaytaskforce/
howto/JustPayS.pdf (stating there will be no progress unless employers are forced to
examine whether they have a pay gap, which will not likely occur voluntarily).
25
See CATALYST, WOMEN’S EARNINGS AND INCOME 7 (2011), available at
http://analyseeconomique.files.wordpress.com/2012/08/earnings-and-income-of-u-swomen-and-men.pdf (showing the earnings of men and women in the United States and
other countries); Jill Andrews, Comment, National and International Sources of Women’s Right
to Equal Employment Opportunities: Equality in Law Versus Equality in Fact, 14 NW. J. INT’L. L.
& BUS. 413, 413 (1994) (“[Countries have] facially similar laws prohibiting
discrimination . . . the difference between equality in law and equality in fact lies in their
implementation.”) (footnote omitted).
26
See generally Marie-Thérèse Chicha, A Comparative Analysis of Promoting Pay Equity:
Models and Impacts, 8–27 (Int’l Labor Office, Geneva, Working Paper 49, 2006) (examining
three approaches used to implement pay equity).
27
Id.; see also infra Part II.C (discussing Sweden’s and Québec’s proactive model).
28
See infra Part II (exploring current remedies to the wage disparity and international
proactive model).
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proactive model approach.29 Next, Part IV of this Note proposes an EPA
amendment that adopts parts of Sweden’s and Québec’s proactive
models, effectively making employers share in the responsibility of
closing the wage gap at the professional level.30
II. BACKGROUND
A. EPA: The Current Legislative Answer to U.S. Wage Disparity
The purpose for enacting the EPA was to remedy “a serious and
endemic problem of employment discrimination in private
industry . . . .”31 The EPA prohibits employers from paying the opposite
sex less money for equal work.32 When the EPA was passed in 1963,
women earned an average of fifty-nine cents for every dollar a man
earned.33 Forty-eight years later, women still only average eighty-one
cents on the dollar.34 At the current rate, the wage gap has been
projected to disappear by the year 2056.35 To address this injustice, a
See infra Part III (discussing the problems with current remedies).
See infra Part IV (proposing a proactive amendment as an alternative remedy).
31
See Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974) (addressing the wage
disparity in the United States). The cretinous wage structure of the mid-twentieth century
was based on an outdated belief that a man, “because of his role in society, should be paid
more than a woman even though his duties are the same.” Id. See also Eisenberg, supra
note 12, at 30 (“Many legislators lamented that the final [version of the] EPA was not as
strong as it needed to be to combat wage discrimination. Representative St. George noted,
‘It is a little bit too little and, of course, it is too late.’”) (footnote omitted). See generally
Audrey Wolfson Latourette, Sex Discrimination in the Legal Profession: Historical and
Contemporary Perspectives, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 859 (2005) (providing an extensive history of
the struggles that women have endured to break into the legal profession and the modern
glass ceiling before the Equal Pay Act).
32
See Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, § 3, 77 Stat. 56, 56–57 (codified and
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2006)) (“[P]aying wages to employees . . . at a rate less
than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex . . . for equal work
on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which
are performed under similar working conditions . . .” violates the EPA); see also Equal Pay
and Compensation Discrimination: Fact Sheet, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (2010)
[hereinafter EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N] http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/
publications/upload/fs-epa.pdf (last updated Apr. 1, 2010) (explaining that employers
cannot pay employees less for jobs that are substantially equal).
33
ARONS, supra note 10, at 2.
34
U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 9, at 7.
35
Women’s Median Earnings as a Percent of Men’s Median Earnings, 1969–2009 (Full-Time,
Year-Round Workers) with Projection for Pay Equity in 2056, INST. FOR WOMEN’S POL’Y RES.,
fig. IWPR # Q004 (Mar. 2011); see WILLIAMS & RICHARDSON, supra note 13, at 9 (discussing
the existing wage disparities between female and male attorneys); see also DEY & HILL, supra
note 13, at 11 (examining the pay gap among college graduates); NAT’L ASS’N OF WOMEN
LAWYERS & NAWL FOUND., supra note 15, at 3 (discussing problems women face in law
firms).
29
30
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discriminated-against professional woman must turn to the EPA or Title
VII.36 This Note focuses on obstacles within the EPA, even though
similar problems exist in Title VII.37
Under the EPA, a professional woman may file an individual claim
in court, make a complaint with the EEOC, or both.38 The EPA, a
predecessor to Title VII, was the first federal sex discrimination law.39
The EPA was an amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938
(“FLSA”), designed to remedy pay discrimination against women.40 The
36
See FIELDS & CHEESEMAN, supra note 9, at 166 (showing available remedies depending
on the statutory basis for the plaintiff’s claim); see also EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N,
supra note 20 (“[S]omeone who has an Equal Pay Act claim may also have a claim under
Title VII.”). See generally Reconciliation with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, in I CIVIL
RIGHTS ACTIONS TREATISE ¶ 20.06 (Lexis 2011) (stating that sex-based wage discrimination
violates both the EPA and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, but the statutes are not
coextensive). For example, some employers will only be liable under one statute but not
the other. Id. ¶ 20.06A. To bring a Title VII claim the employer must have fifteen or more
employees. Id. However, Title VII is broader because it is not limited to sex but rather
applies to discrimination based on race, color, religion, and national origin. Id. ¶ 20.06B.
37
Title VII has a different prima facie standard and has a broader mandate than the
EPA. See GEORGE RUTHERGLEN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW: VISIONS OF EQUALITY
IN THEORY AND DOCTRINE 117–18 (2001) (noting the differences between the EPA and Title
VII). The EPA is limited to sex discrimination, and, therefore, Title VII will not be
discussed in-depth. Id. at 118. However, Title VII is mentioned because the affirmative
defenses and reliance on an individual complaint are the same as the EPA. See id.
(discussing the Bennett Amendment and incorporation of EPA’s affirmative defenses into
Title VII). As a result, this Note will cite Title VII cases that involve the affirmative defense
“any factor other than sex.”
38
See EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, supra note 20 (explaining how the EEOC
handles allegations of an EPA violation); see also MACK A. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW 123 (1988) (noting there are no administrative prerequisites, no presuit charges, no administrative investigations or conciliation required before bringing a
suit); RUTHERGLEN, supra note 37, at 158 (noting EEOC requirements for filing Title VII
claims); REBECCA HANNER WHITE, EMPLOYMENT LAW AND EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
167–68 (1998) (noting that, unlike Title VII, FLSA governs EPA claims and does not require
the plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies before bringing an EPA claim); Eisenberg,
supra note 12, at 30 (stating plaintiffs do not have to file a charge with the EEOC before
bringing a private action).
39
See Eisenberg, supra note 12, at 29 (discussing the beginning of the concept of equal
pay for equal work).
40
Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, § 3, 77 Stat. 56, 56–57 (codified and amended
at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2006)); see 4 IVAN E. BODENSTEINER & ROSALIE BERGER LEVINSON,
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT CIVIL RIGHTS LIABILITY § 7:1 (2010) (discussing the history
of the EPA). The Act applies to both men and women, but women have traditionally been
the beneficiaries. Id. See generally Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259, 265 (3d Cir.
1970) (stating the reason for enactment of the EPA was “to eliminate the depressing effects
on living standards of reduced wages for female workers and the economic and social
consequences which flow from it”) (footnote omitted). The EPA, as originally enacted, did
not even apply to the white-collar professional. See Juliene James, Note, The Equal Pay Act
in the Courts: A De Facto White-Collar Exemption, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1873, 1881–82 (2004)
(explaining that the addition of the EPA to the FLSA originally limited the type of
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EPA and FLSA were enforced by the U.S. Department of Labor’s Wage
and Hour Administrator until President Carter reassigned the
enforcement of the EPA to the EEOC in an effort to consolidate all antidiscrimination laws under one agency.41 The EPA is considered a
complaint-based model, because it is enforced through complaints made
either by individuals or through the EEOC.42
1.

EPA: Complaint-Based Model

Individuals who are paid less because of their sex may file suit
against their employer pursuant to the EPA.43 In order to prevail on an
EPA claim, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case and rebut
several affirmative defenses provided by the employer.44 To establish a
prima facie case under the EPA, the plaintiff has the initial burden of
proving: (1) the employer pays the worker of one sex more than the
opposite sex; (2) the employees perform equal work, which is
determined by equal skill, effort, and responsibility; and (3) the jobs are

professions protected by the legislation). Since the EPA was an amendment to FLSA, it was
therefore subject to the same white-collar exemptions. Id. The FLSA contained a “white
collar” clause that exempted those “employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or
professional capacity” from bringing claims under the Act. Fair Labor Standards
Amendments of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-30, § 9(a)(1), 75 Stat. 65, 71 (codified and amended 29
U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (2006)). These “white collar” exemptions were justified on the basis of
administrative difficulty, autonomy concerns, and symbolic value of certain jobs. James,
supra, at 1892–94. “[Administrative difficulty] assumes that the type of work done by
executives, professionals, and administrative workers is qualitatively different from that
done by wage earners, such that the work done by one white-collar employee cannot be
divided among many and therefore is not ‘spreadable.’” Id. at 1892. “Autonomy” is the
idea that executives are sufficiently compensated and are in a better position to control
their income and therefore do not need protection. Id. at 1893. Adherents to the “symbolic
value” position argue that though exempted workers are not sufficiently compensated,
they receive a benefit from the identification with a class that has the freedom to advance in
careers and are not in need of protection. Id. at 1894. Since the EPA’s passage, Congress
has eliminated the white collar exemptions. 29 C.F.R. § 1620.1(a)(1) (2011).
41
See Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978, 45 Fed. Reg. 19,807 (May 9, 1978) (authorizing
the transition of the EPA’s enforcement power from the Department of Labor to the EEOC);
see also FIELDS & CHEESEMAN, supra note 9, at 158 (noting that the EEOC enforces Title VII).
See generally EEOC v. Home of Econ., Inc., 712 F.2d 356, 357 (8th Cir. 1983) (explaining the
Reorganization Plan did not create a conciliation requirement before filing an EPA claim).
42
See PAY EQUITY TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, supra note 21, at 111 (explaining that the
complaint-based model relies on the employee to initiate the pay equity review).
43
See Equal Pay Act of 1963 § 206(d)(1) (prohibiting employers from discriminating on
the basis of sex by paying lower wages). The prima facie standard for Title VII is outside
the scope of this Note.
44
See generally id. (discussing the affirmative defenses available to an employer);
Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195–96 (1974) (discussing the prima facie
burden of an EPA claim).
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performed under similar working conditions.45 Whether the plaintiff has
established a prima facie case typically turns on whether the work
engaged in is “substantially equal” to her male peers.46 The substantially
equal standard has been interpreted to lie somewhere between
“comparable” and “identical.”47
Courts have developed two interpretations of substantially equal:
(1) the strict approach and (2) the pragmatic approach.48 Courts
applying the strict approach often decline to find professional jobs as
substantially equal, specifically in instances where executives manage
different departments.49 In Wheatley v. Wicomico County, the Fourth
Circuit, applying the strict approach, determined that, since the directors
45
Corning Glass Works, 417 U.S. at 195 (discussing the requirements to establish an EPA
claim); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1620.13(a) (2011) (“The equal work standard does not require that
compared jobs be identical, only that they be substantially equal.”); 29 C.F.R. § 1620.15(a)
(“[Equal skill] includes consideration of such factors as experience, training, education, and
ability.”); 29 C.F.R. § 1620.16(a) (“[Equal effort] is concerned with the measurement of the
physical or mental exertion needed for the performance of a job.”); 29 C.F.R. § 1620.17(a)
(“[Equal] responsibility is concerned with the degree of accountability required in the
performance of the job, with emphasis on the importance of the job obligation.”); 29 C.F.R.
§ 1620.18(a) (stating the working condition requirement of the EPA adopts a flexible
standard that enlists practical judgment to determine the difference).
46
See BODENSTEINER & LEVINSON, supra note 40, § 7:7 (discussing how courts have
interpreted the substantially equal standard); see also Equal Work—General Principles, in I
CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS TREATISE, supra note 36, ¶ 20.14(A) (stating the most intricate
element of the EPA is proving the equal work requirement).
47
See Thompson v. Sawyer, 678 F.2d 257, 271–72 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (illustrating that the
widely adopted “substantially equal” test is a middle course between “exactly alike” and
“merely comparable”). “[T]he phrase ‘equal work’ does not mean that jobs must be
identical, but merely that they must be ‘substantially equal.’” Id. at 272. The court
examined the legislative history of the EPA and found that it contained “ammunition both
for those who would insist on a very narrow reading of ‘equality,’ and for those who
would urge a more expansive understanding of the term.” Id. at 271 (footnote omitted).
See also 29 C.F.R. § 1620.14(a) (“‘[E]qual’ does not mean ‘identical.’”).
48
See Eisenberg, supra note 12, at 39 (discussing courts’ approaches to handling
substantially equal).
49
See generally Sims-Fingers v. City of Indianapolis, 493 F.3d 768, 772 (7th Cir. 2007)
(holding that the managers of two parks were not comparable because the parks were so
different from one another); Wheatley v. Wicomico Cnty., 390 F.3d 328, 332 (4th Cir. 2004)
(holding that the work of managers was not comparable because they worked in different
departments); Berg v. Norand Corp., 169 F.3d 1140, 1146 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that thirtythree male managers could be paid $6,000–$8,000 more than seven female mangers because
their tasks were substantially different); Sprague v. Thorn Ams., Inc., 129 F.3d 1355, 1364
(10th Cir. 1997) (holding that assistant mangers of different departments were not
comparable); Georgen-Saad v. Tex. Mut. Ins. Co., 195 F. Supp. 2d 853, 857 (W.D. Tex. 2002)
(explaining that courts should not be in the business of second guessing decisions
involving hiring and compensating executives); Ratts v. Bus. Sys., Inc., 686 F. Supp. 546,
550 (D.S.C. 1987) (“Allegations of Equal Pay Act violations have routinely been rejected by
courts applying the equal work standard to jobs involving executive and management
positions.”).
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worked in different departments, they could not be substantially equal.50
In Ratts v. Business Systems, Inc., the District Court of South Carolina also
applied the strict approach, finding directors who performed a core
group of tasks were not comparable because there were additional duties
in each department that were not the same.51
Courts that utilize the pragmatic approach focus on whether the core
functions or general purpose of the job are substantially similar and then
determine if the additional tasks are significant enough to establish the
jobs as unequal.52 The Northern District Court of Alabama held in
Crabtree v. Baptist Hospital of Gadsden Inc. that vice presidents in different
departments were substantially equal.53 In Simpson v. Merchant, the
50
390 F.3d at 333. The female heads of departments had the same management
responsibilities as their male counterparts in other departments but were paid $25,000 less
a year. Id. at 331. The plaintiffs asserted that managers, regardless of department subjectmatter, were comparable because they performed the same supervisory duties. Id. The
court declined to consider department managers with general similar responsibilities as
equal. Id. at 333. The court interpreted the legislative intent behind the word “equal” as
meaning “virtually identical.” Id. The court said, “We decline to hold that having a similar
title plus similar generalized responsibilities is equivalent to having equal skills and equal
responsibilities.” Id. at 334.
51
686 F. Supp. at 550. The female vice president earned $60,000–$70,000 less than her
peer male vice presidents, although they performed a core of similar tasks. Id. at 549. The
plaintiff attempted to show her duties were equal to those of other male vice presidents. Id.
at 548. The court conceded that, although all vice presidents performed similar tasks,
including “supervision of employees, corporate decision making, participation in trade
shows and the general goal of selling a product,” the jobs were not substantially equal
because they performed different additional duties. Id. at 550.
52
See Eisenberg, supra note 12, at 39; see also EEOC v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co.,
653 F.2d 1243, 1245 (8th Cir. 1981) (“Whether two jobs entail equal skill, equal effort, or
equal responsibility requires a practical judgment on the basis of all the facts and
circumstances of a particular case.”); see, e.g., Brown v. Fred’s, Inc., 494 F.3d 736, 740–41 (8th
Cir. 2007) (holding that a jury could have concluded that the difference of working at a
larger store was not a justification for paying a female manager $100 less than the male
managers); Simpson v. Merchs. & Planters Bank, 441 F.3d 572, 578 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding
that vice presidents were substantially equal); Brewster v. Barnes, 788 F.2d 985, 991 (4th
Cir. 1986) (holding that male and female correctional officers were substantially equal);
Denman v. Youngstown State Univ., 545 F. Supp. 2d 671, 677 (N.D. Ohio 2008) (holding
that male and female cabinet officers were substantially equal because they were within the
same job grade and job family); Rinaldi v. World Book, Inc., No. 00 C 3573, 2001 WL
477145, at *9 (N.D. Ill. May 3, 2001) (holding that the vice presidents’ work, although in
different departments, were considered to be comparable); Crabtree v. Baptist Hosp. of
Gadsden, Inc., No. 82-AR-1849-M, 1983 WL 30400, at *4 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 21, 1983) (finding
that the vice presidents’ jobs were comparable, even though they had different
responsibilities and a different number of employees under their control). But see Merillat
v. Metal Spinners, Inc., 470 F.3d 685, 695–96 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that a senior buyer and
male managerial employee had a common core of tasks, but they were unequal because
some of the tasks required different responsibilities).
53
Crabtree, 1983 WL 30400, at *4–5. The defendants asserted that, since none of the
assistant vice presidents had the same area of responsibility or had the same number of
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Eighth Circuit compared the assistant vice president to an untitled bank
officer because, although they carried out different tasks, they possessed
similar skills.54 After the employee establishes a prima facie case, the
employer may invoke affirmative defenses.55
There are four affirmative defenses listed in the statute: (1) pay
based on a seniority system, (2) a merit pay system, (3) a system that
measures earnings by quantity or quality of production, or (4) payment
based on any factor other than sex.56 If the plaintiff can establish a prima
facie case, the burden of persuasion then shifts to the employer to show
that the difference in pay is justified under one of the Act’s four
exceptions.57 The most commonly invoked affirmative defense is “any
factor other than sex.”58 To establish this defense, employers can point to
any job-related or business reason other than sex to justify the difference
in pay.59 For example, the Third Circuit has held that a department store
employees under their supervision, the jobs were not equivalent, and the plaintiff failed to
meet her burden of proof. Id. at *4. The court found that pay was so disparate between the
single female officer and male officers that it could not be attributed to anything other than
sexual discrimination. Id. at *5.
54
Simpson, 441 F.3d at 578. Although Simpson had the title of assistant vice president
and Henry had the title of bank officer, the court found a jury could have concluded that
they possessed the same experience, training, education, and ability to perform their jobs.
Id. at 576–78. The court held that difference of college degree was irrelevant because all the
skills required for the job were learned on-the-job. Id. at 578. The jury awarded Simpson
damages in the amount of $35,664.37. Id. at 577.
55
Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, § 3, 77 Stat. 56, 56–57 (codified and amended
at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2006)).
56
Id. Note that these affirmative defenses have been incorporated into Title VII. Id.
57
Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 196 (1974). The court summarized the
four exceptions:
The Act establishes four exceptions—three specific and one a
general catchall provision—where different payment to employees of
opposite sexes “is made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit
system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality
of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor than sex.”
Id. (footnote omitted).
58
See BODENSTEINER & LEVINSON, supra note 40, § 7:14 (“The most litigated defense
under the Equal Pay Act is that the wage disparity is based on a ‘factor other than sex.’”)
(footnote omitted); Eisenberg, supra note 12, at 57–60 (describing “any factor other than
sex” as the most controversial affirmative defense); see also Dey v. Colt Constr. & Dev. Co.,
28 F.3d 1446, 1462 (7th Cir. 1994) (explaining how broadly the court is to construe the any
factor other than sex affirmative defense).
59
See Eisenberg, supra note 12, at 60 (explaining the majority of circuits and the EEOC’s
view on the fourth affirmative defense); see also Taylor v. White, 321 F.3d 710, 719 (8th Cir.
2003) (explaining the court was not concerned with “the wisdom or reasonableness” of the
fourth affirmative defense); Dey, 28 F.3d at 1462 (“[T]he EPA’s fourth affirmative defense is
a broad ‘catch-all’ exception [that] embraces an almost limitless number of factors, so long
as they do not involve sex. . . . The factor need not be ‘related to the requirements of the
particular position in question,’ nor must it even be business-related.”).
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could pay men more than women because the men’s department was
more profitable than the women’s department.60 Profitability of a
department was considered to be a factor other than sex.61
Many courts follow the “legitimate business reason” approach,
which requires that the factor be job-related and a reasonable business
practice.62 Other courts, including the Seventh Circuit, have broadly
interpreted the defense as meaning any reason, regardless of whether it
is legitimate, provided it is not based on sex.63 In addition to or instead
of filing an EPA claim individually, plaintiffs may elect to allege a

60
See Hodgson v. Robert Hall Clothes, Inc., 473 F.2d 589, 597 (3d Cir. 1973) (explaining
the wage differential was not based on sex but supported by a reasonable business
decision). The department store’s policy would not permit men or women to work in the
department of the opposite sex. Id. at 591. Although statistics revealed full-time male
employees made more dollar sales per hour than females, the women could not sell the
high-priced items sold in the men’s department. Id. at 593–94.
61
See id. at 594 (agreeing with the district court that economic benefits could justify the
wage differential).
62
See EEOC v. J.C. Penney Co., 843 F.2d 249, 253 (6th Cir. 1988) (“[T]he ‘factor other than
sex’ defense does not include literally any other factor, but a factor that, at a minimum, was
adopted for a legitimate business reason.”). The Sixth Circuit further explains that it
adopts the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation set out in Kouba v. Allstate Insurance Co. to avoid
the extreme application of “any factor other than sex.” Id. See also Kouba v. Allstate Ins.
Co, 691 F.2d 873, 876 (9th Cir. 1982) (“The Equal Pay Act concerns business practices. It
would be nonsensical to sanction the use of a factor that rests on some consideration
unrelated to business. An employer thus cannot use a factor which causes a wage
differential between male and female employees absent an acceptable business reason.”).
In Kouba, the court held that prior salary was an acceptable business reason. Id. at 876.
63
See Wernsing v. Dep’t of Human Servs., Ill., 427 F.3d 466, 468 (7th Cir. 2005) (asserting
that courts should not determine what is an acceptable or good reason); see also Cullen v.
Ind. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 338 F.3d 693, 702–03 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that education,
marketplace value of skills, and prior salary constitute adequate factors other than sex);
Markel v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wisc. Sys., 276 F.3d 906, 913 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding
that one employee was “justifiably paid more” because that employee had worked for the
university longer and had held the position of program director, thus the discrepancy was
not based on sex); Aldrich v. Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 520, 525 (2d Cir. 1992)
(asserting that Congress did not want the affirmative defense to be construed so broadly);
Horner v. Mary Inst., 613 F.2d 706, 714 (8th Cir. 1980) (acknowledging that a woman’s
willingness to be paid less is an insufficient justification but that an employer may employ
a market value assessment of a particular employee’s skills to determine his or her salary).
But see Ende v. Bd. of Regents of Regency Univs., 757 F.2d 176, 183 (7th Cir. 1985) (finding
that an adjustment formula eliminating pay differential from past discrimination as valid);
Hodgson v. Brookhaven Gen. Hosp., 436 F.2d 719, 726 (5th Cir. 1970) (stating that an
employer’s bargaining power that is greater over women than over men “is not the kind of
factor Congress had in mind”). After an employee of Northern Illinois University (“NIU”)
filed a complaint in the Regional Office of Civil Rights (“OAR”) alleging salary and job
discrimination, the OAR and NIU conducted investigations. Id. at 178. NIU found an
average of $150,000 discrepancy between male and female faculty and instituted a salary
formula that would pay female faculty an additional $150,000 on a yearly basis. Id.
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complaint with the EEOC. After an investigation, the EEOC has the
discretion on whether to file a complaint.64
2.

EEOC: Enforcement of the EPA

The EEOC originally was formed to enforce Title VII but has
subsequently become responsible for enforcing all federal antidiscrimination laws, including the EPA.65 As a result of the agency’s
additional enforcement responsibilities, the EEOC has become
understaffed and underfunded.66 The EEOC receives, investigates, and
resolves charges of discrimination filed against private employers,
employment agencies, labor unions, and the government.67 In addition
to investigating allegations of discrimination, the EEOC collects
workforce data from employers with more than one hundred
employees.68 Employers are required to file reports disclosing their
employees’ gender, race, and job categories.69 The data is collected for
See infra Part II.A.2 (discussing the role of the EEOC and the EPA).
U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, supra note 32; see FIELDS & CHEESEMAN,
supra note 9, at 158 (discussing the purpose of the EEOC and the procedure of filing a claim
with the
EEOC);
Overview,
U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N,
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/index.cfm (last visited Sept. 28, 2011) (describing the
responsibility of the EEOC).
66
See Kathryn Moss, Scott Burris, Michael Ullman, Matthew Johnsen & Jeffrey Swanson,
Unfunded Mandate: An Empirical Study of the Implementation of the Americans with Disabilities
Act by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 6 (2001) (pointing
out problems with the EEOC). The EEOC was formed in 1964 under the Civil Rights Act,
but the agency has continued to take on additional statutory obligations without receiving
additional funding. Id.
67
See Administrative Enforcement and Litigation, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N,
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/enforcement_litigation.cfm (last visited Sept. 28, 2011)
(discussing EEOC methods for handling complaints). In 2009, the EEOC received 93,277
private sector charges of discrimination and 7,277 requests for hearings in the federal
sector. Enforcement, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, http://www.eeoc.gov/
eeoc/enforcement/index.cfm (last visited Dec. 20, 2012) (discussing EEOC enforcement
practices). The EEOC also has a mediation program for both the private and federal sectors
that has resolved claims more efficiently over the past few years. Id.
68
See EEO Reports/Surveys, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N,
http://www.eeoc.gov/employers/reporting.cfm (last visited Sept. 28, 2011) (explaining
EEOC reporting duties). The data collected is shared with other federal agencies in order
to avoid duplicate collection. Id. See also EEO-1: Who Must File, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T
OPPORTUNITY
COMM’N
[hereinafter
EEO-1:
Who
Must
File],
http://www.eeoc.gov/employers/eeo1survey/whomustfile.cfm (last visited Sept. 28,
2011) (stating that all private employers subject to Title VII with over one hundred
employees must fill out a Standard Form-100, also known as an EEO-1). State and local
government, schools, and other groups file different forms. Id.
69
See EEO-1: Who Must File, supra note 68 (stating who must file surveys with the
EEOC). See generally EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, INSTRUCTION BOOKLET (Jan. 5,
2006) [hereinafter INSTRUCTION BOOKLET], http://www.eeoc.gov/employers/eeo1survey/
64
65
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numerous reasons, including enforcement, employer self-assessment,
and research.70
The FLSA does not provide the EEOC with enforcement powers to
adjudicate EPA claims.71 The EPA can be enforced by an employee,
which is known as private action, or by the EEOC, which is known as
public action.72 In a public action, the EEOC can seek an injunction, or it
can recover unpaid wages on behalf of the employee, plus liquidated
damages.73 Private individuals can sue only if they have not previously
accepted relief from a public action and if a public action has not been
filed on their behalf.74 The EPA was considered revolutionary for its
time, but the “equal work” standard has been considered by many to be
an ineffective remedy for women in upper-level professions.75 As a
result, Congress has made two legislative proposals targeting these EPA
flaws.76

upload/instructions_form.pdf (listing general job categories that are listed on the EEO-1
with corresponding skills and training requirements).
Job categories include
executive/senior level officials and managers, first/mid-level officials and managers,
professionals, technicians, sales workers, administrative support workers, craft workers
(skilled), operatives (semi-skilled), laborers and helpers (unskilled), and service workers.
Id.
70
See EEO-1: Who Must File, supra note 68 (stating what data is collected); see also
INSTRUCTION BOOKLET, supra note 69, at 1 (stating that the EEO-1 is not voluntary and the
EEOC may compel an employer to file this form by obtaining an order from a U.S. district
court).
71
See Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-30, § 9(a)(1), 75 Stat. 65,
71 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 213(a)(1), 216–17 (2006)) (addressing the penalties
and right of action for those who violate the EPA—but note there is no adjudication
procedure within the agency); RUTHERGLEN, supra note 37, at 116 (“The FLSA authorizes
the Secretary of Labor to bring civil enforcement actions, but an executive reorganization
plan transferred this authority to the EEOC.”) (footnote omitted). “[T]he EEOC can sue for
back pay” and liquidated damages under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) and for injunctive relief,
including back pay but not liquidated damages, under 29 U.S.C. § 216(c). Id.
72
See Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1961, 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(b)–(c) (explaining
who can sue and what can be recovered in an action against an employer); PLAYER, supra
note 38, at 123 (stating how the EPA is enforced and the remedies available to employees).
73
29 U.S.C. §§ 216(b)–(c).
74
29 U.S.C. § 216(b); see RUTHERGLEN, supra note 37, at 116 (noting what damages
plaintiffs can recover).
75
See Eisenberg, supra note 12, at 46 (asserting that the equal work standard has imposed
a glass ceiling for professional women). During the passage of the bill, Congressmen
voiced concerns. Id. at 30. Representative Dwyer stated, “There are a number of
weaknesses in this bill which I believe unwisely limit the scope of its application and
unnecessarily encumber its enforcement.” Id.
76
See infra Part II.B (examining the FPA and PFA).
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B. Proposed Legislation to Amend the EPA’s Complaint-Based Model
Over the years, Congress has reintroduced the Fair Pay Act (“FPA”)
and the Paycheck Fairness Act (“PFA”) in an effort to ameliorate the
EPA’s inability to close the wage gap.77 Both pieces of legislation target
different flaws of the EPA. The FPA changes the substantially equal
standard to “equivalent jobs.” “‘[E]quivalent jobs’ means jobs that may
be dissimilar, but whose requirements are equivalent, when viewed as a
composite of skills, effort, responsibility, and working conditions.”78 For
example, Senator Harkin explained that in social work, a primarily
female-dominated job, employees are paid less than probation officers, a
primarily male-dominated job, even though both jobs require equal skill,

77
Fair Pay Act of 2011, H.R. 1493, 112th Cong. (2011) (introducing the bill on April 12,
2011, and referring it to the House subcommittee on Workforce Protections on May 20,
2011); Paycheck Fairness Act, H.R. 1519, 112th Cong. (2011); Fair Pay Act of 2011, S. 788,
112th Cong. (2011) (introducing a related bill that was referred to the Senate Committee on
Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions on April 12, 2011); see also Editorial, Progress on Fair
Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/28/opinion/
28wed3.html?scp=1&sq=progress%20on%20fair%20pay&st=cse (passing the PFA in the
House in 2009, which was originally paired with the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act
(“LLFPA”) for a chamber vote; however, congressional leadership was concerned the
LLFPA would not pass, so they decided to pass the PFA). The Fair Pay Act was introduced
in the 103rd Congress and has been reintroduced in every subsequent session. See H.R.
1493 & S. 788; Fair Pay Act of 2009, H.R. 2151 & S. 904, 111th Cong. (2009); Fair Pay Act of
2007, H.R. 2019 & S. 1087, 110th Cong. (2007); Fair Pay Act of 2005, H.R. 1697 & S. 840,
109th Cong. (2005); Fair Pay Act of 2003, H.R. 1695 & S. 841, 108th Cong. (2003); Fair Pay
Act of 2001, H.R. 1362 & S. 684, 107th Cong. (2001); Fair Pay Act of 1999, H.R. 1271 & S. 702,
106th Cong. (1999); Fair Pay Act of 1997, H.R. 1302 & S. 232, 105th Cong. (1997); Fair Pay
Act of 1995, S. 1650, 104th Cong. (1996); Fair Pay Act of 1995, H.R. 1507, 104th Cong. (1995);
Fair Pay Act of 1994, H.R. 4803, 103d Cong. (1994). The Paycheck Fairness Act has been
introduced in the 111th, 110th, 109th, and 108th Congress. See Paycheck Fairness Act, H.R.
12 & S. 182, 111th Cong. (2009); Paycheck Fairness Act, H.R. 1338 & S. 766, 110th Cong.
(2007); Paycheck Fairness Act, H.R. 1687 & S. 841, 109th Cong. (2005); Paycheck Fairness
Act, H.R. 1688 & S. 76, 108th Cong (2003). The PFA has passed the House in previous
sessions, but it consistently failed in the Senate committee. Ashely Portero, What You Need
to Know About the Paycheck Fairness Act, INT’L BUS. TIMES (June 1, 2012, 4:48 PM),
http://www.ibtimes.com/what-you-need-know-about-paycheck-fairness-act-701179.
78
H.R. 1493 § 3(a)(4)(B) (emphasis added); see 151 CONG. REC. S840 (daily ed. Apr. 19,
2005) (referencing floor statements made by Senator Harkin that female dominated jobs,
such as social work, childcare, nurses, and teachers, are historically undervalued and
underpaid). By allowing courts to compare jobs that are dissimilar, the FPA effectively
targets the EPA’s occupational segregation, which perpetuates the devaluation of women’s
work. See Daniel N. Kuperstein, Note, Finding Worth in the New Workplace: The Implications
of Comparable Worth’s Reemergence in the Global Economy, 24 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 363,
391 (2007) (“[The FPA] was introduced as a means of correcting the pay between jobs that
‘should’ be paid the same—even if the jobs are in dissimilar occupations that nonetheless
are deemed to have equivalent skills, effort, responsibility, and working conditions.”)
(footnote omitted).
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effort, and responsibility.79 The FPA would allow these seemingly
dissimilar jobs to be comparable.80
The PFA, championed as the “common-sense bill” by President
Obama, revises the “any factor other than sex” affirmative defense to a
heightened standard that will require “a bona fide factor other than sex,
such as education, training, or experience.”81 A bona fide factor is
specifically one not based on sex, but job-related and consistent with
business necessity.82 As discussed in Part III, neither factor provides a
comprehensive solution to prevent litigation.83 However, the ILO
recognizes an alternative approach to closing the wage gap—the
proactive model—which places responsibility on the employer to
maintain fair pay practices, thus preempting the need for litigation.84

79
See Press Release, U.S. Sen. Tom Harkin of Iowa, Equal Pay for Equal Work (Apr. 9,
2004), available at http://harkin.senate.gov/press/column.cfm?i=222096 (commemorating
Equal Pay Day).
80
See supra note 75 and accompanying text (illustrating the ineffectiveness of the
remedies provided by the EPA, and hence the FPA was needed).
81
See H.R. 1519 § 3(a)(2) (enhancing enforcement of equal pay requirements by using the
bona fide factor other than sex); Jesse Lee, President Obama Speaks out for Paycheck Fairness,
THE WHITE HOUSE BLOG (July 20, 2010, 11:56 AM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/
blog/2010/07/20/president-obama-speaks-out-paycheck-fairness
(addressing
the
importance of the Paycheck Fairness Act). The Act also forbids retaliation against
employees for exploring fair pay claims. H.R. 1519 § 3(b). The Act enhances penalties
against employers for unlawful practices, including punitive damages. Id. § 3(c). The PFA
authorizes grants for negotiation and skill training programs for girls and women. Id.
§ 5(b). See Kimberly J. Houghton, The Equal Pay Act of 1963: Where Did We Go Wrong?, 15
LAB. LAW. 155, 173–74 (1999) (explaining specifically what the FPA amends); Vicky Lovell,
Evaluating Policy Solutions to Sex-Based Pay Discrimination: Women Workers, Lawmakers, and
Cultural Change, 9 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 45, 58–59 (2009) (discussing
how the FPA addresses the occupation segregation of the EPA); see also H.R. 1519 § 3(a)
(striking the “any factor other than sex” and inserting the bona fide factor defense). The
PFA also enhances penalties against employers for violation of the act by adding punitive
damages. Id. § 3(c). The PFA authorizes grants for negotiation and skill training programs
for girls and women. Id. § 5(b).
82
See H.R. 1519 § 3(a)(B) (“The bona fide factor defense . . . shall apply only if the
employer demonstrates that such factor (i) is not based upon or derived from sex-based
differential compensation; (ii) is job-related with respect to the position in question; and
(iii) is consistent with business necessity.”). Note, however, the business necessity defense
will not apply “where the employee demonstrates that an alternative employment practice
exists that would serve the same business purpose without producing such differential and
that the employer has refused to adopt such alternative practice.” Id.
83
See infra Part III (discussing how the proposed amendments do not address the major
flaws of the EPA).
84
See infra Part II.C (introducing Sweden’s and Canada’s proactive model).
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C. Introducing the International Proactive Models: Sweden & Canada
Wage disparity is an international epidemic.85 Although the right to
equal pay has been enshrined in international charters and conventions,
pay inequality continues.86 The ILO, after examining alternative models,
determined the Swedish and Canadian proactive models to be the most

85
See CATALYST, supra note 25, at 7 (showing pay discrepancies in foreign countries); see
also Howard LaFranchi, Hillary Clinton at UN: ‘Women’s Progress Is Human Progress’, THE
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Mar. 12, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/ForeignPolicy/2010/0312/Hillary-Clinton-at-UN-Women-s-progress-is-human-progress
(highlighting the United Nations’ attention to women’s issues). Secretary Clinton,
addressing the United Nations, stated, “[W]omen’s progress is human progress, and
human progress is women’s progress,” echoing the sentiment she conveyed fifteen years
earlier at the World Conference on Women in Beijing when she said, “[W]omen’s rights are
human rights, and human rights are women’s rights.” Id. See, e.g., Stephen Kurczy,
International Women’s Day: Which Nation Has the Smallest Pay Gap for Women?, THE
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, (Mar. 8, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.com/Business/2010/
0308/International-women-s-day-Which-nation-has-smallest-pay-gap-for-women
(reporting which countries have the largest and smallest wage disparities). Sweden is
ranked second internationally among countries where women’s pay is closest to men’s. Id.
86
See Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
art. 11(1), Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW] (requiring parties to take
“all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the field of
employment” and mandating the right to equal remuneration); International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 7(a)(i), Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter
ICESCR] (requiring equal pay for equal work, specifically citing women); International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 26, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter
ICCPR] (“All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination
to the equal protection of the law.”); Convention Concerning Equal Remuneration for Men
and Women Workers for Work of Equal Value, art. 2.1, 3.1, June 6, 1951, ILO C100
(requiring member states to ensure application of equal remuneration for work of equal
value by instituting measures such as objective job appraisal). Both Canada and Sweden
have ratified all four of these conventions, but the United States has only ratified ICCPR
and signed ICESCR and CEDAW. See Ratifications of C100-Equal Remuneration Convention,
1951 (No. 100), ILO, http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11300:0::NO:11300:
P11300_INSTRUMENT_ID:312245 (last visited Nov. 1, 2012) (providing a list of nations
which have ratified the remuneration convention); see also United Nations Treaty
Collections, Database of United Nations Treaty Collections, Ratifications of International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights by Country (copy on file with
Valparaiso University Law School Library) (providing the ratification, accession, and
succession dates of all nations); United Nations Treaty Collections, Database of United
Nations Treaty Collections, Ratifications of International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights by Country (copy on file with Valparaiso University Law School Library) (providing
the ratification, accession, and succession dates of all nations); United Nations Treaty
Collections, Database of United Nations Treaty Collections, Ratifications of Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women by Country (copy on file
with Valparaiso University Law School Library) (providing the ratification, accession, and
succession dates of all nations).
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effective approaches to eliminating the wage gap.87 Experts believe the
proactive model is the most effective because it imposes a responsibility
on the employer to review pay practices and correct wage
discrimination.88 Both Canada and Sweden have passed legislation that
puts an obligation on the employer to ensure jobs of equal value receive
equal pay and establishes a government commission to provide
oversight and accountability.89
1.

Canada’s Proactive Model

Canadian provinces, including Ontario and Québec, have passed
equal pay legislation.90 Ontario passed its Pay Equity Act in 1990, and
Québec passed a similar act in 1996.91 Both acts require employers to
87
See Mary Cornish, Securing Pay Equity for Women’s Work—Everyone Benefits—The
International Experience, ILO Equal Pay for Work of Equal Value 7–8 (Aug. 25, 2008),
http://www.cavalluzzo.com/publications/newsletters/securingpayequityforwomenswor
k_cornish_september7_08.pdf (asserting that the proactive model is the most effective
approach to achieve pay equity); About the ILO, INT’L LAB. ORG.,
http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/lang--en/index.htm (last visited Aug. 13, 2012)
(explaining the ILO is an agency of the United Nations responsible for overseeing
international labor standards); see also Chicha, supra note 26, at 8 (examining the
international models used to achieve pay equity). Since the ILO has determined that the
model used by Sweden and Canada is the most effective, this Note will focus on this
model’s approach. The United Kingdom’s and Netherlands’s methods use an “equal
opportunity” approach that requires employers to conduct a thorough assessment of job
dimensions as a diagnosis for unfair wages, but subsequently requires the employer to
eliminate the disparity within a set time frame. Id. at 15. Alternatively, France and
Switzerland attempt to fulfill equal work for equal pay requirements by using broad,
federally-designated characteristics to compare “equal” work; it then requires employers to
submit an overview of progress. Id. at 19–25.
88
See Chicha, supra note 26, at 10 (examining the effectiveness of the proactive model);
see also PAY EQUITY TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, supra note 21, at 111 (stating that, unlike the
complaint-based models, which only remedy that particular complaint, proactive models
provide broader application because they put a burden on the employer to eliminate wage
disparity from the beginning). Proactive legislation requires employers to demonstrate
that they have taken steps to analyze wages and eliminate discriminatory pay practices. Id.
at 66.
89
See DISKRIMINERINGSLAG (Svensk författningssamling [SFS] 2008:567) (Swed.),
www.do.se/Documents/pdf/new_discrimination_law.pdf (demonstrating that Sweden
has passed equal pay legislation); Pay Equity Act, R.S.Q. 2010, c. E-12.001 (Can.),
www.ces.gouv.qc.ca/documents/publications/anglais.pdf (providing Québec’s equal pay
legislation); Pay Equity Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.7 (Can.) (providing Ontario’s passed equal
pay legislation); see also Chicha, supra note 26, at 10–15 (examining Sweden and Québec’s
approach to equal pay in companies and organizations); Cornish, supra note 87, at 7
(examining the three international models). Note that both Sweden and Canada have
ratified international conventions that hold them accountable for equal pay for equal work.
90
R.S.Q. 2010, c. E-12.001 (Can.); R.S.O. 1990, c. P.7 (Can.).
91
See Chicha, supra note 26, at 12 (discussing two of Canada’s provinces that have
proactive legislation); see also PAY EQUITY TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, supra note 21, at 65
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first develop pay equity plans and, second, to establish a government
commission tasked with enforcement of the act.92 This Note examines
Québec’s pay equity plan and Ontario’s government commission.
a.

Québec’s Pay Equity Act

Québec’s Pay Equity Act was enacted with the purpose of
addressing systematic gender discrimination subsequent to pay
inequity.93 The Act mandates employers with fifty or more employees to
develop pay equity plans.94 However, only employers with one hundred
or more employees must establish a pay equity plan and a pay equity
committee within their enterprise.95 Pay equity committees represent
both employers and employees and are responsible for establishing a
pay equity plan.96
The pay equity plan is a four-step process.97 Step one identifies those
job classes that are predominately female and predominately male.98
(stating that the federal government passed the Canadian Human Rights Act in 1977,
which provides recourse through a complaint). The report explains that jurisdictions
which have not adopted pay equity legislation can seek relief through this general statute.
Id. at 66. But the report found that the federal complaint-based model had been subject to
considerable criticism, thus, leading to provinces adopting proactive legislation. Id.
92
See generally R.S.Q. 2010, c. E-12.001 (Can.); R.S.O. 1990, c. P.7 (Can.) (discussing pay
equity action plans and government enforcement).
93
R.S.Q. 2010, c. E-12.001 § 1 (Can.). The Pay Equity Act was enacted in 1996 but was
subsequently amended and updated in August 2010. See Chicha, supra note 26, at 12
(discussing two Canadian proactive approaches to redressing pay inequity).
94
R.S.Q. 2010, c. E-12.001 § 31 (Can.). If the enterprise has less than fifty employees, the
employer may elect, but is not obligated, to establish a pay equity plan. Id. § 34.
95
Id. § 10. However, if the enterprise has fifty to ninety-nine employees, the employer
may elect, but is not obligated, to set up a pay equity committee. Id. § 31.
96
Id. §§ 16, 21.1. The committee must have at least three members, two-thirds of the
committee must represent employees, and half of the members representing employees
must be women. Id. § 17. The employer will provide the required training to every
employee on the committee. Id. § 26. See Chicha, supra note 26, at 13 (stating that
employers are required by law to provide pay equity committee employees with necessary
training to enable them to carry out their responsibilities). Companies with fifty to ninetynine employees are not required to form committees, but rather employees and trade
unions must formulate a pay equity plan. Id. See generally R.S.Q. 2010, c. E-12.001 §§ 16–
30.1 (Can.) (discussing additional procedural roles of the pay equity committee).
97
R.S.Q. 2010, c. E-12.001 § 50 (Can.); see PAY EQUITY TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, supra
note 21, at 112 (identifying characteristics of the proactive model). The pay equity laws aim
for equality in results, not just in opportunity. Id.
98
R.S.Q. 2010, c. E-12.001 § 53 (Can.). Predominately male and female classes of jobs are
identified as those which have similar duties or responsibilities, similar required
qualifications, and the same remuneration or rate of compensation. Id. § 54. Jobs are
considered to be predominately female or male if held by sixty percent of the same sex. Id.
§ 55. See Chicha, supra note 26, at 12 (stating that the Act provides criteria for determining
job categories and alternative criteria for determining the gender predominance).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2013

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 47, No. 2 [2013], Art. 26

604

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

Step two develops a method, tools, and an evaluation process to
determine the value of job classes.99 Step three involves the evaluation of
predominately male and female jobs using the method selected in step
two and the calculation of subsequent wage disparities.100 Step four
determines the terms and conditions of payment and adjustments in
compensation.101 The Act requires the pay equity plan be completed in
four years and the results be posted in a prominent place easily
accessible to employees for sixty days.102 If an employee is not satisfied
with the pay equity plan or is of the opinion that the employer has not
made adjustments in compensation, then she may file a complaint with
the governmental oversight commission.103
b.

The Pay Equity Commission of Ontario

Ontario passed the Pay Equity Act in 1990.104 The Act established
the Pay Equity Commission of Ontario (“PEC”), which has two distinct
bodies: the Pay Equity Office (“PEO”) and the Pay Equity Hearings
Tribunal (“PEHT”).105 The PEO is responsible for enforcement of the Pay

99
R.S.Q. 2010, c. E-12.001 § 56 (Can.). To determine the value of each job class, the
following must be considered: qualifications, responsibilities, effort, and work conditions.
Id. § 57. See Chicha, supra note 26, at 12 (stating the criteria for determining job class value).
100
R.S.Q. 2010, c. E-12.001 §§ 59, 60 (Can.). The pay equity committee—or employer if
there is no committee—will identify differences in compensation between the
predominately male and female classes and make adjustments accordingly. Id. §§ 60, 68.
See Chicha, supra note 26, at 13 (“Specific methods of comparing pay—on an individual and
on a global basis—are presented, leaving the choice up to those in charge of the
programme.”).
101
R.S.Q. 2010, c. E-12.001 § 69 (Can.). “Adjustments in compensation may be spread
over a maximum period of four years.” Id. § 70. The employer cannot reduce the pay of
another employee to achieve pay equity. Id. § 73. See Chicha, supra note 26, at 13
(discussing the four year compliance time frame).
102
R.S.Q. 2010, c. E-12.001 §§ 37, 75 (Can.). After the pay equity plan has been
implemented, the employer will conduct a pay equity audit every five years. Id. § 76.1.
These audits were not part of the original Act in 1996. Id. See Pay Equity Act, Q. Gaz. 1996,
c. 43 § 40 (Can.) (providing the repealed text from the 2010 revised statute). The original
text stated that an employer must maintain pay equity in his enterprise after adjustments to
compensation have been made or plan action equity adopted. Id.
103
R.S.Q. 2010, c. E-12.001 §§ 96–99 (Can.).
104
See The Pay Equity Act, PAY EQUITY COMM’N, http://www.payequity.gov.on.ca/
en/about/the_act.php (last visited Aug. 13, 2012) (discussing the Pay Equity Act).
105
See Pay Equity Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.7 § 27(1)–(2) (Can.) (explaining the administration
of the Act); see also About the Pay Equity Commission, PAY EQUITY COMM’N [hereinafter PAY
EQUITY COMM’N], http://www.payequity.gov.on.ca/en/about/index.php (last visited
Aug. 13, 2012) (last visited Aug. 13, 2012) (discussing the role of the Pay Equity
Commission). See generally R.S.Q. 2010, c. E-12.001 §§ 77–78, 93, 132 (Can.) (establishing
Québec’s Commission de l’équité salariale, or Pay Equity Commission, consisting of three
members that oversee the implementation of the Act, including pay equity plans). The
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Equity Act by investigating and resolving complaints and objections to
pay equity plans through its Review Services division.106 The PEHT
adjudicates disputes that arise under the Pay Equity Act.107
The PEO has Review Officers monitor the preparation and
implementation of the pay equity plans and investigates complaints filed
with the PEC.108 If the Review Officer does not believe the pay equity
plan is being implemented according to the terms of the Act, he or she
may order the employer to comply.109 If the employer fails to comply
with the direct order, the Review Officer may refer the matter to the
PEHT for adjudication and sanctions.110 The PEHT can impose financial
penalties ranging from $5,000–$50,000 for non-compliance with the
Act.111 A survey conducted by the Institute de la Statistique du Québec
in 2005 revealed that 80.2% of organizations with over two hundred
employees completed pay equity plans.112 Canada is not the only
country that has adopted a proactive model; Sweden enacted pay equity
laws over twenty years ago.113
2.

Sweden’s Proactive Model

Sweden has one of the highest levels of gender equality in the
world.114 In 2008, the legislature passed The Discrimination Act, which

Commission may conduct pay equity audits, make investigations on its own initiative, or
follow up on a reported dispute or complaint. Id. § 93(1), (6), (7).
106
See PAY EQUITY COMM’N, supra note 105 (discussing the role of the Pay Equity
EQUITY
COMM’N,
Commission);
see
also
The
Pay
Equity
Office,
PAY
http://www.payequity.gov.on.ca/en/about/office.php (last visited Aug. 13, 2012)
(explaining PEO’s two operation units, Review Services and Educational and
Communication Services). The Review Services Unit is responsible for enforcing the Act,
whereas the Educational and Communication Services Unit is tasked with developing
resources to assist workplaces with Act compliance. Id.
107
PAY EQUITY COMM’N, supra note 105. The PEHT “has exclusive jurisdiction to
determine all questions of fact or law” under the Pay Equity Act. Id. All PEHT’s decisions
are final. Id.
108
R.S.O. 1990, c. P.7 § 34(2) (Can.). See The Pay Equity Office, supra note 106 (discussing
the role of Review Officers).
109
R.S.O. 1990, c. P.7 § 24(2) (Can.).
110
Id. § 24(5). If the employer fails to comply, the matter may be referred to the Hearings
Tribunal. Id. In the hearing, the employer carries “the burden of proving that he, she or it
has complied with the order.” Id. § 24(5.3).
111
Id. § 26(1).
112
Chicha, supra note 26, at 14.
113
See infra Part II.C.2 (introducing Sweden’s pay equity laws).
114
Gender Equality: The Swedish Approach to Fairness, SWED. INST., 1 (Aug. 2011)
[hereinafter SWED. INST.], http://www.sweden.se/eng/Home/Society/Equality/Facts/
Gender-equality-in-Sweden/. Gender equality is a cornerstone in Sweden. Id. Starting in
pre-school, students are taught about equal opportunities in life, regardless of gender. Id.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2013

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 47, No. 2 [2013], Art. 26

606

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

adopted and consolidated the majority of Sweden’s anti-discrimination
acts, including The Equal Opportunities Act.115 The Act endeavors to
equalize wages and prevent future pay inequity for those who perform
work of equal value.116 Equal work is determined by an overall
assessment of job requirements, including, but not limited to, knowledge
and skills, responsibility, and effort.117 The Act requires employers to
take affirmative steps to balance the distribution of males and females in
different employment categories and enables both males and females to
combine employment with parenthood.118
Swedish women on average earn 94 percent of men’s salaries. Id. at 3. There has been an
increase in women leading private companies and sitting on boards of companies. Id. at 3.
115
See 1 ch. 1 § DISKRIMINERINGSLAG (Svensk författningssamling [SFS] 2008:567) (Swed.)
(“The purpose of this Act is to combat discrimination and in other ways promote equal
rights and opportunities regardless of sex, transgender identity or expression, ethnicity,
religion or other belief, disability, sexual orientation or age.”); JÄMSTÄLLDHETSLAG (Svensk
författningssamling [SFS] 1991:433) (Swed.) (amended by [SFS] 2000:773) (“The purpose of
the Act is to promote equal rights for women and men in matters relating to work, the
terms and conditions of employment and other working conditions, and opportunities for
development in work (equality in working life).”); see also Fact Sheet: New Anti-Discrimination
Legislation and a New Agency, the Equality Ombudsman, MINISTRY OF INTEGRATION AND
GENDER EQUALITY, GOV’T OFF. OF SWED. (Jan. 2009), http://www.sweden.se/eng/
Home/Work/Labor-market/Employee-rights/Anti-discrimination-laws/Facts/New-antidiscrimination-legislation/ (discussing what is in the new anti-discrimination legislation).
The Discrimination Act replaces the Equal Opportunities Act; the Act on Measures against
Discrimination in Working Life on Grounds of Ethnic Origin, Religion or Other Religious
Faith; the Prohibition of Discrimination in Working Life on Grounds of Sexual Orientation
Act; the Equal Treatment of Students at Universities Act; the Prohibition of Discrimination
Act; and the Act Prohibiting Discriminatory and Other Degrading Treatment of Children
and School Students. Id.
116
3 ch. 2 § DISKRIMINERINGSLAG.
117
See id. (explaining how equal work is determined). The Act uses “such as,” implying
that the criteria are not limited to knowledge and skills, responsibility and effort. Id. See
also Chicha, supra note 26, at 11 (discussing Sweden’s former Equal Opportunity Act).
Under the Equal Opportunities Act of 1991:
The employer is required to formulate a pay equity action plan in
order to ensure that remuneration is fixed on the basis of objective
criteria that are common to all jobs. The Act is intended to counter
both pay disparities between women and men doing the same job and
those existing between predominately female or male jobs that have
equal value. The Act details the factors that must be taken into
account in the evaluation and include qualifications, responsibilities,
efforts and working conditions.
Id.
118
See 3 ch. 5, 8 §§ DISKRIMINERINGSLAG (discussing an employer’s obligation to maintain
the work environment and recruitment of employees). Employers are to promote equal
distribution of work by means of education and training. Id. 8 §. When the distribution is
unequal, employers are supposed to make a special effort when recruiting employees of
the underrepresented sex when vacancies arise. Id. 9 §. See also SWED. INST., supra note 114
(stating that Swedish parents are “entitled to 480 days of [paid] parental leave when a child
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The Act mandates that every three years an employer survey and
analyze its provisions and practices regarding pay and examine pay
differences between men and women conducting work of equal value.119
An employer is also required to assess whether the existing pay
differences are directly or indirectly related to sex.120 Additionally,
employers are obligated to draw up an action plan for equal pay in
which they report the results of their survey, indicate what adjustments
need to be made, and estimate the costs and time necessary for executing
those adjustments, not exceeding three years.121 Employers with less
than twenty-five employees do not need to draw up plans for equal
pay.122
Sweden’s Discrimination Act created a new agency—the Equality
Ombudsman and Board against Discrimination—to oversee compliance
with the Act.123 The Ombudsman may bring an action on behalf of
individuals who file complaints and may compel information from
employers pertaining to those complaints.124 Employers that do not
comply with the Act or the requests of the Equality Ombudsman are
subject to monetary fines.125 The Board against Discrimination, at the
recommendation of the Equality Ombudsman, may issue financial
is born or adopted”).
See generally Employment-based Benefits, SWEDEN.SE,
http://www.sweden.se/eng/Home/Work/The-Swedish-system/Employment_based_
benefits/Parental-leave/ (last visited Aug. 15, 2012) (asserting parental leave is a central
part of Swedish life, and therefore parents share 480 days of paid leave).
119
3 ch. 10 § DISKRIMINERINGSLAG.
Contra 10 § Jämställdhetslagen (Svensk
författningssamling [SFS] 1991:433) (Swed.) (indicating that, under the former Act,
employers were required to conduct annual surveys). See Chicha, supra note 18, at 11
(discussing employers’ responsibility to conduct surveys).
120
3 ch. 10 § DISKRIMINERINGSLAG.
121
Id. 11 §. Contra 11 § Jämställdhetslagen (indicating that, under the former Act,
employers were required to conduct annual pay equity plans).
122
3 ch. 11 § DISKRIMINERINGSLAG. Contra 11 § Jämställdhetslagen (indicating that, under
the former Act, employers with less than ten employees did not need make plans for equal
pay).
123
See 4 ch. 1 § DISKRIMINERINGSLAG (stating the responsibility of the Ombudsman is to
get employers to voluntarily comply). See generally MINISTRY OF INTEGRATION AND GENDER
EQUALITY, GOV’T OFF. OF SWED., supra note 115 (discussing the Equality Ombudsman’s and
Board against Discrimination’s new agency roles).
124
See 4 ch. 2–3 §§ DISKRIMINERINGSLAG (discussing the breadth of the Ombudsman’s
authority to inquire about an employer’s pay practices).
125
4 ch. 4, 5 §§ DISKRIMINERINGSLAG.
The Equality Ombudsman then makes
recommendations to the Board against Discrimination to issue fines for failure to comply
with the Act. Id. 5 §. The Equality Ombudsman can issue financial penalties to employers
without approval of the Board against Discrimination for failure to comply with their
investigation. See id. 4 § (noting that the Board against Discrimination reviews decisions to
order financial penalties that the Equality Ombudsman orders on an individual failing to
comply). The Board against Discrimination hears appeals for those monetary fines issued
by the Equality Ombudsman. Id. 7 §.
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penalties.126 Although Canada’s and Sweden’s proactive pay equity laws
have been recognized as the best approach to remedying wage disparity,
the United States has not adopted or proposed any similar laws.127
III. ANALYSIS
The EPA’s complaint-based model is an ineffective approach to
addressing wage disparity at the white-collar level, primarily for two
reasons. First, the EPA’s current framework is disadvantageous because
professional plaintiffs are required to carry a difficult burden of proof in
establishing that their job is substantially equal to their peers in terms of
skill, effort, responsibility, and working conditions.128 Additionally, the
EPA provides employers with four affirmative defenses, including the
broad “any factor other than sex” defense to shield them from liability.129
Second, the more substantial problem with the EPA is that employees
alone, not employers, are burdened with responsibility for curtailing the
systemic wage disparity by filing arduous and often ineffective
complaints.130
Part III.A of this Note examines the EPA’s disadvantageous
framework. Specifically, Part III.A.1 discusses the substantially equal
standard; Part III.A.2 examines the any factor other than sex affirmative
defense; and Part III.A.3 explores Congress’s legislative endeavors to
address these EPA deficiencies.131 Then, Part III.B advocates for
Congress to adopt an approach similar to Canada’s and Sweden’s
proactive models in an effort to combat systemic wage disparity.132 In
particular, Part III.B.1 identifies the benefits to the pay equity action plan,
See 4 ch. 5, 7, 9 §§ DISKRIMINERINGSLAG (permitting the Board against Discrimination
to ensure that applications for financial penalties from the Equality Ombudsman are
adequately investigated and ordered). See Chicha, supra note 26, at 11–12 (discussing the
results of Sweden’s equal pay laws). A small survey conducted by the Equality
Ombudsman between 2004 and 2005 revealed that twenty-four organizations needed to
amend their pay practices, and, in all of these cases, the organizations complied with wage
adjustment. Id. Thus, the survey demonstrates the need for both enforcement and followup by government commissions. Id. at 12.
127
See Part III (examining the problems of the EPA and the benefits of the proactive
model).
128
See infra Part III.A.1 (discussing the difficulty of proving the EPA’s substantially equal
prima facie burden).
129
See infra Part III.A.2 (discussing the problems associated with the EPA’s any factor
other than sex affirmative defense).
130
See infra Part III.A (noting that the EPA is a complaint-based model and employers do
not share a similar responsibility).
131
See infra Part III.A.1 (discussing the difficult substantially equal standard plaintiffs
must prove); infra Part III.A.2 (discussing the any factor other than sex affirmative defense
that employers can utilize); infra Part III.A.3 (discussing current legislative proposals).
132
See infra Part III.B (analyzing the proactive model).
126
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and Part III.B.2 stresses the importance of a government commission to
enforcement.133
A. The EPA’s Disadvantageous Framework
Although some would argue the EPA is advantageous to addressing
wage disparity because of the strides made since its enactment in 1963, in
reality, the EPA’s framework is disadvantageous because it discourages
plaintiffs from bringing a claim.134 Under the EPA, a plaintiff must
prove that she was paid less than her male peers for substantially equal
work.135 Then, if she manages to carry her burden of proof, the Act
provides the employer with affirmative defenses, including the any
factor other than sex defense to avoid liability.136 Although the Supreme
Court has announced that the EPA should be construed and applied
broadly so as to actually be an effective remedy against wage
discrimination, the current framework creates too many obstacles for
plaintiffs to overcome.137 In practice, requiring plaintiffs to satisfy the
prima facie burden and navigate through affirmative defenses results in
few EPA claims surviving summary judgment.138 This high summary
judgment rate places substantial risk on the plaintiffs, which discourages
them from filing a suit.139 The obstacles facing plaintiffs are further
133
See infra Part III.B.1 (explaining the flexibility of the pay equity action plans); infra Part
III.A.2 (explaining how government commissions act as enforcement mechanisms).
134
See Part III.A (addressing the difficulties that plaintiffs face while pursuing an EPA
claim).
135
See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing the EPA’s prima facie burden).
136
See supra Part II.B (analyzing the EPA’s affirmative defenses).
137
See Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 208 (1974) (“The Equal Pay Act is
broadly remedial, and it should be construed and applied so as to fulfill the underlying
purposes which Congress sought to achieve.”).
138
See Eisenberg, supra note 12, at 32–34 (analyzing the effectiveness of the EPA by
examining all published federal appellate and Supreme Court decisions that considered an
EPA claim). In the 1970s, ninety-seven percent of EPA claims were decided at the district
court level by a bench or jury trial. Id. at 33. “From 2000 to 2009, only 31% of reported
appellate cases had been decided at trial in the district court.” Id. In the early years of the
EPA, appellate courts were more likely to reverse a jury or bench trial verdict than in recent
decades. Id. at 34. During the first decade of EPA litigation, appellate courts reversed
forty-five percent of jury verdicts for employers. Id. The appellate courts, in the most
recent decade, have “affirmed all verdicts that resulted from trials in the district court.” Id.
“From 2000 to 2009, the courts of appeal affirmed grants of summary judgment for the
employer by the district courts 92% percent of the time.” Id. See also Sandra F. Sperino,
Rethinking Discrimination Law, 110 MICH. L. REV. 69, 86 (2011) (explaining that courts are
relying on existing typologies and that those claims which do not fit within these archaic
frameworks will be rejected). The author asserts that the discrimination claim frameworks
are unable to keep up with changes in the workplace, and the sheer number of them makes
them procedurally and theoretically inconsistent. Id.
139
See Eisenberg, supra note 12, at 32–34 (examining trends in summary judgment).
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exacerbated by the EPA’s inconsistent substantially equal standard and
the EPA and Title VII’s broadly interpreted affirmative defense—any
factor other than sex.140
1.

The Difficulty of Proving “Substantially Equal”

To establish a prima facie case under the EPA, a plaintiff bears the
burden to prove her job is “substantially equal” to that of her male
peer.141 The substantially equal standard is a difficult burden for whitecollar employees to carry because often the jobs are not exactly the
same.142 Some courts follow the strict approach, which requires jobs to
be identical, while other courts follow the pragmatic approach, which
provides more deference to the employee by allowing jobs to be
comparable, so long as the core set of tasks are similar.143 Unfortunately,
the strict approach serves to facilitate the dismissal of EPA claims at
summary judgment and, in effect, perpetuates the glass ceiling.144
To the detriment of the plaintiff, courts that follow the strict
approach have declined to compare professional jobs unless the jobs are
fungible or mirror images of each other.145 Even though the Supreme
Court has held that the EPA is broadly remedial, courts continue to

See infra Part III.A.1 (exploring the various interpretations of substantially equal).
See supra text accompanying note 46 (discussing the determination of equal skill,
effort, and responsibility as “substantially equal”); see also Corning Glass Works, 417 U.S. at
195–96 (discussing the plaintiff’s burden). In Corning Glass Works, the Court noted that the
plaintiff must show the following: (1) the employer pays the worker of one sex more than
the opposite sex; (2) the employees perform equal work, which is determined by equal
skill, effort, and responsibility; and (3) the jobs are performed under similar working
conditions. Id. at 195. Although the white-collar exemptions were lifted, courts have
difficulty comparing substantially equal work in bona fide executive, administrative, or
professional positions. See generally Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1961, Pub. L. No.
87-30, § 9(a)(1), 75 Stat. 65, 71 (codified and amended 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (2006))
(providing an exemption for white-collar workers); 29 C.F.R. § 1620.1(a) (2011)
(demonstrating that the white-collar exceptions were eliminated from the EPA).
142
See supra note 40 (explaining reservations made about comparing white-collar jobs).
143
See supra text accompanying notes 46–54 (examining the various court interpretations
of substantially equal).
144
See infra text accompanying notes 149–50 (discussing the trend among appellate courts
in affirming summary judgment).
145
Eisenberg, supra note 12, at 39; see Sprague v. Thorn Ams., Inc., 129 F.3d 1355, 1365
(10th Cir. 1997) (refusing to apply the EPA broadly, the court found the assistant manager’s
work was merely comparable and not substantially equal); Ratts v. Bus. Sys., Inc., 686 F.
Supp. 546, 550 (D.S.C. 1987) (“Allegations of Equal Pay Act violations have routinely been
rejected by courts applying the equal work standard to jobs involving executive and
management positions.”). See generally BODENSTEINER & LEVINSON, supra note 40, § 7:6
(noting that in the professional setting there are many factors that explain why wage
differential may not implicate sex discrimination).
140
141
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apply the strict approach at the detriment of professional women.146 For
example, some courts have rejected the invitation to compare male and
female managerial jobs in different departments as equal, even though
they essentially performed the same tasks of supervising, coordinating,
and organizing.147 The mentality of the strict approach stems from the
incorrect belief that professional jobs are either too difficult to compare
because they do not perform commodity-like work or, alternatively, that
“no judge or jury should be allowed to second guess the complex
remuneration decisions of businesses . . . .”148
The strict approach has an adverse effect on plaintiffs who bring
EPA claims.149 Plaintiffs who bring EPA claims in the Seventh Circuit
have an abysmal success rate of twenty-four percent.150 Judge Posner of
the Seventh Circuit has remarked, “The proper domain of the Equal Pay
Act consists of standardized jobs in which a man is paid significantly
more than a woman . . . and there are no skill differences.”151 Thus, in
effect, the strict approach prevents the courts from comparing

146
See Sims-Fingers v. City of Indianapolis, 493 F.3d 768, 772 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that
the managers of two parks were not comparable “because the parks [were] so different
from one another”); Berg v. Norand Corp., 169 F.3d 1140, 1146 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that
thirty-three male managers could be paid $6,000–$8,000 more than seven female mangers
because their tasks were substantially different).
147
Wheatley v. Wicomico Cnty., 390 F.3d 328, 333 (4th Cir. 2004); Ratts, 686 F. Supp. at
550.
148
Georgen-Saad v. Tex. Mut. Ins. Co., 195 F. Supp. 2d 853, 857 (W.D. Tex. 2002)
(“Requiring Defendant and other companies to either pay senior executives the same
amount or to come to court to justify their failure to do so is simply beyond the pale.”); see
Ratts, 686 F. Supp. at 550 (acknowledging that the task of comparing
executive/management positions is a difficult one).
149
See Eisenberg, supra note 12, at 34 (acknowledging that the Seventh and Eighth Circuit
are the most hostile to EPA claims).
150
Id. Plaintiffs have a success rate of thirty-nine percent in the Eighth Circuit. Id. The
author correlates these low percentages with the court’s strict interpretation of “equal
work” and broad interpretation of “factor-other-than-sex.” Id. The courts most receptive
to EPA claims are the Sixth Circuit, with a success rate of eighty-five percent, and the D.C.
Circuit, with a success rate of seventy-five percent. Id. at 35.
151
Sims-Fingers, 493 F.3d at 771–72 (emphasis added); see Wernsing v. Dep’t. of Human
Servs., Ill., 427 F.3d 466, 468 (7th Cir. 2005) (asserting that the EPA should not be a
mechanism to authorize judges to investigate practices of employers). The court drew an
analogous comparison to a Title VII case:
As we say frequently when dealing with equivalent questions under
other federal statutes, such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964:
“A district judge does not sit in a court of industrial relations. No
matter how medieval a firm’s practices, no matter how high-handed its
decisional process, no matter how mistaken the firm’s managers, Title
VII and § 1981 do not interfere.”
Id. (quoting Pollard v. Rea Magnet Wire Co., 824 F.2d 557, 560–61 (7th Cir. 1987)).
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professional jobs unless there are no differences between them.152 The
strict approach is effective at providing remedies to lower-wage workers
who work in standardized, hourly wage jobs where the tasks are clearly
comparable to that of their male counterparts.153 But for the women who
have advanced to executive level positions, the strict approach does not
allow for a comparison of those jobs and, thus, effectively closes off the
EPA as an avenue for remedying wage inequality.154
Fortunately, not all courts follow the strict approach—other courts
have adopted the more forgiving pragmatic approach.155 The pragmatic
approach, which allows courts to use “practical judgment,” is beneficial,
because it takes into account the regulatory definitions of equal skill,
effort, and responsibility to establish whether the overall job function is
the same.156 The pragmatic approach is better than the strict approach,
because it allows for flexibility in determining what is substantially equal
and permits differences in various degrees.157 This is evidenced when
courts, adopting the pragmatic approach, have held that vice presidents
are substantially equal, even though they did not perform the exact same
job.158

Sims-Fingers, 493 F.3d at 771–72.
Eisenberg, supra note 12, at 41.
154
Id.
155
Id. at 42, 46.
156
Id. at 41–42; see EEOC v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 653 F.2d 1243, 1245 (8th Cir.
1981) (“[A] court must compare the jobs in question in light of the full factual situation and
the broad remedial purpose of the statute.”).
157
See Eisenberg, supra note 12, at 42 (explaining definitions for skill, effort, and
responsibility). The author explains that defining “skill” is about the amount of skill or
degree of skill rather than a specific set of skills and, at the professional level, is based on
education and the professional abilities needed for the job. Id. at 42–43. Similarly, the
author explains the “effort” requirement is easier to apply to white-collar jobs because it is
not based on physical or mental exertion, but on whether the knowledge applied to the job
was the same. Id. at 43. Finally, the author defines “responsibility” as the “degree of
accountability required in the performance of the job, with emphasis on the importance of
the job obligation.” Id. at 42.
158
See Crabtree v. Baptist Hosp. of Gadsden, Inc., No. 82-AR-1849-M, 1983 WL 30400, at
*4 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 21, 1983) (finding that different responsibilities did not make the jobs
unequal). The court recognized female vice presidents earned thousands of dollars less
and stated that the difference in pay between male officers and the sole female officer was
so disparate that it could not be attributed to anything but sexual discrimination. Id. at *5.
See also Simpson v. Merchs. & Planters Bank, 441 F.3d 572, 578–79 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding
that, when comparing the vice president positions, a jury could determine that both
employees possessed similar skills and that the jobs required the same effort and
responsibility). Examining the first factor of skill, the court concluded that both vice
presidents possessed the same experience, training, education, and ability to perform their
jobs. Id. at 578. The second factor, effort, was determined to be equal because both
employees were required to apply the same base of banking knowledge to their jobs. Id.
152
153
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Unlike the strict approach, another advantage of the pragmatic
approach is that it provides courts discretion when comparing
executives, managers, and professionals in different departments.159 The
courts operate under the broad remedial purpose of the statute by first
looking at a common core of tasks to determine whether jobs are equal
and then whether there are a significant number of tasks to establish that
the jobs are unequal.160 But, even if the court applies the pragmatic
approach when reviewing a plaintiff’s claim, employers can still shield
themselves from liability by citing any of the four affirmative defenses,
including any factor other than sex.161
2.

The Difficulty of Getting Around the “Any Factor Other than Sex”
Affirmative Defense

The EPA and Title VII both have the affirmative defense of any
factor other than sex, which has been applied in various ways.162 Courts
that require a legitimate business reason, as opposed to courts
employing a broader interpretation of any factor, are more in line with
the EPA’s remedial intent.163 Without a legitimate business-related
consideration, the factor other than sex defense puts a “gaping loophole
The third factor, responsibility, was also determined to be equal because both vice
presidents did work that required a high degree of accountability. Id.
159
See Rinaldi v. World Book, Inc., No. 00 C 3573, 2001 WL 477145, at *9 (N.D. Ill. May 3,
2001) (holding that the work of vice presidents is still comparable even if they work in
different departments). The core of common tasks requirement was established because
both vice presidents had administrative responsibilities, and summary judgment was not
appropriate because there was a material question of fact on whether additional tasks
made the jobs substantially different. Id. See also Denman v. Youngstown State Univ., 545
F. Supp. 2d 671, 677 (N.D. Ohio 2008) (holding that male and female cabinet officers were
substantially equal because they were within the same job grade and job family).
160
Brewster v. Barnes, 788 F.2d 985, 991 (4th Cir. 1986) (quoting Brobst v. Columbus
Servs. Int’l, 761 F.2d 148, 156 (3rd Cir. 1985)). In Brewster, the court compared male and
female correctional officers and found a core of common tasks, because both officers
“supervised inmates, transported prisoners, searched visitors, and served as chief jailor
when necessary.” Id. See Brown v. Fred’s Inc., 494 F.3d 736, 740–41 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding
that the difference of working at a larger store was an insubstantial difference, and
therefore there was no justification for paying a female manager $100 less than the male
managers). See generally supra text accompanying note 137 (explaining that the EPA is
broadly remedial and should be applied that way).
161
See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the inconsistent interpretations of the any factor other
than sex defense).
162
See supra note 37 (explaining the similarities between the Equal Pay Act and Title VII);
see also supra notes 62–63 and accompanying text (illustrating cases where employers used
the any factor other than sex defense).
163
See Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 208 (1974) (“The Equal Pay Act is
broadly remedial, and it should be construed and applied so as to fulfill the underlying
purposes which Congress sought to achieve.”).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2013

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 47, No. 2 [2013], Art. 26

614

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

in the statute” and provides employers with an unprecedented
opportunity to circumvent the EPA.164 However, the other side would
argue that the any factor other than sex defense “does not authorize
federal courts to set their own standards of ‘acceptable’ business
practices . . . [but bases their determination on] whether the employer
has a reason other than sex—not whether it was a ‘good’ reason.”165 This
broad interpretation undoubtedly contributes to the low success rate of
EPA claims throughout the appellate courts.166
Further impairing a plaintiff’s EPA claim is the interpretation of
some appellate courts; they have interpreted “any factor other than sex”
to mean literally any factor, thus allowing employers to defeat an EPA
claim by pointing to any reason not related to sex.167 But most courts
require an acceptable or legitimate business reason.168 However, those
courts that examine legitimate business reasons have only applied them
to non-supervisory jobs, like clerks and sale agents, and not to
professional occupations.169 Congress, in an attempt to ameliorate the
EPA’s inconsistent substantially equal standard and the EPA and Title
VII’s broad affirmative defense—any factor other than sex—has
proposed the FPA and the PFA.170

164
See Aldrich v. Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 520, 525 (2d Cir. 1992) (stating the
legitimate business reason defense aligns with Congress’s general policy goals under the
EPA). However, the court pointed out that Congress did not intend for employers to make
menial distinctions based on the title of the position. Id. The court wrote, “Surely Congress
did not intend that an employee would lose an EPA claim after making out a prima facie
case of wage discrimination simply because, for example, the employer chooses to call one
employee a cleaner and another employee a custodian.” Id.
165
Wernsing v. Dept. of Human Servs., Ill., 427 F.3d 466, 468 (7th Cir. 2005); see Taylor v.
White, 321 F.3d 710, 719 (8th Cir. 2003) (explaining the court was not concerned with “the
wisdom or reasonableness” of the fourth affirmative defense); supra note 63 and
accompanying text (discussing the Seventh Circuit’s broad interpretation of the affirmative
defense).
166
See Eisenberg, supra note 12, at 35 tbl.4 (illustrating plaintiffs’ EPA claim success rates
in different circuits). Plaintiffs are more likely to prevail in the Sixth Circuit, where the
success rate is eighty-five percent, versus the Seventh Circuit, where the success rate is
twenty-four percent. Id.
167
Id. at 60 (noting the Seventh and Eighth Circuit will take any “acceptable” reason).
168
See supra note 62 (illustrating instances where the courts have required legitimate
business reasons).
169
Eisenberg, supra note 12, at 59.
170
See infra Part III.A.3 (examining the FPA and PFA as possible remedies to the wage
disparity).
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Analyzing Current Legislative Proposals to Fix “Substantially Equal”
and “Any Factor Other than Sex”

Congress has made legislative attempts to remedy the substantially
equal and any factor other than sex defenses but has not sought to put in
place any preventative measures to curtail the systemic wage inequity.
These legislative attempts—the FPA and PFA—make gains in amending
the EPA’s disadvantageous framework but are far from complete.171
The FPA is a positive change because it alters the language from the
substantially equal standard to “equivalent jobs.”172 The equivalent job
standard would make it all but impossible for courts to utilize the strict
approach.173 Under the FPA, courts would be mandated to follow the
more pragmatic approach, providing deference to employees by broadly
interpreting the job requirements and leading to higher success rates in
court.174 The PFA, Congress’s other legislative proposal, targets the
broad application of any factor other than sex.175
The PFA weakens the fourth affirmative defense because it modifies
the any factor other than sex defense to “a bona fide factor other than
sex, such as education, training, or experience . . . .”176 By specifying
certain bona fide factors, Congress significantly narrowed the fourth
affirmative defense and removed the confusion as to what type of
permissible factors courts should evaluate.177 The beneficial change from
“any” to “bona fide” effectively eliminates the broad, minority
interpretation of any factor other than sex, thereby increasing a plaintiff’s
chances of surviving summary judgment.178
While both acts will have a positive impact because they reduce the
obstacles plaintiffs face in bringing EPA claims and create more
consistency among courts, the acts do not reach the major problem of the
EPA—the lack of affirmative responsibility on the employer to remedy

171
The Fair Pay Act of 2011, H.R. 1493, 112th Cong. (2011); Paycheck Fairness Act, H.R.
1519, 112th Cong. (2011).
172
H.R. 1493 § 3(a).
173
Id. § 3(a)(4)(B). The amendment, if passed, would have a positive impact on the EPA
because it will constructively require courts to compare dissimilar jobs. Id.
174
See supra Part III.A.1 (examining the pragmatic and strict approach to substantially
equal).
175
H.R. 1519 § 3(a).
176
Id.
177
See id. (striking any factor other than sex and requiring instead a bona fide factor,
including education, training, or experience).
178
See supra Part III.A.2 (examining the different interpretations of the any factor other
than sex defense).
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pay inequality.179 Canada and Sweden have developed proactive laws
that target this particular flaw by requiring employers to routinely
review pay practices, amend unfair wages, and submit pay equity plans
to a governmental oversight commission.180
B. The Benefits of the Proactive Model
The proactive model is the most effective approach in addressing
pay inequality, because it corrects current wage disparity in the
workplace and serves as a preventative measure against future wage
disparity.181 The proactive model accomplishes these claims by placing
an affirmative responsibility on the employer to ensure equal pay
practices within his or her establishment through the development of
pay equity plans.182 Additionally, the model is effective because of the
government commission, which is tasked with both the enforcement of
the pay equity plans and the adjudication of violations of the equal pay
acts.183
1.

Flexibility and Feasibility of Pay Equity Plans

The proactive approach is advantageous because it preempts the
need for employees to bring arduous claims by placing an affirmative
responsibility on employers to correct and maintain equal pay practices
within their establishments.184 Unlike the current model, which places
no concrete obligations on the employer, the proactive model mandates
that the employer create a pay equity plan that produces tangible results
in wage practices within a certain time frame.185 The four-step process of
the proactive model provides a systematic remedy to address the

179
See The Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, § 3, 77 Stat. 56, 56–57 (1963) (codified
and amended at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2006)) (noting in the EPA text no affirmative
responsibility on the employer to actively protect employees from being paid less).
180
See infra Part III.B (explaining how the proactive model would be an improvement
over the complaint-based approach).
181
See infra Part III.B.1 (discussing the benefit of the pay equity plan). Contra § 3, 77 Stat.
at 56–57 (noting there are no affirmative obligations on the employer to maintain equal pay
practices).
182
See infra Part III.B.1 (addressing the pay equity plan’s flexibility and likelihood of
implementation).
183
See infra Part III.B.2 (noting the importance of governmental oversight).
184
PAY EQUITY TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, supra note 21, at 111 (stating that, unlike the
complaint-based models which only remedy that particular complaint, proactive models
provide broader application because they place a burden on the employer to eliminate
wage disparity from the beginning).
185
Id. at 112. Proactive legislation aims for “equality of results, not just equality of
opportunity.” Id.
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systematic problem of wage disparity because it acts as a preventative
mechanism within each establishment.186
The Québec and Swedish pay equity action plans share four distinct
steps, including the surveillance of pay practices, the development of
unique evaluation systems to compare the value of job classes within
that establishment, the evaluation of job classes using the prescribed
system, and the implementation of pay changes over a set period of
time.187 A major benefit of the pay equity plan is that companies are
more likely to implement the plan because of the flexibility it affords.188
For example, in both the Québec and Swedish acts, employers are
provided flexibility or latitude to determine what work is of “equal
value” within their own establishment, rather than risking a negative
interpretation by a judge.189 Québec’s Act is more restrictive than
Sweden’s because Québec states certain criteria that “must” be included
in the determination value of job classes.190 Sweden’s pay equity
186
See id. (examining characteristics of proactive models). Sweden and Québec have both
passed equal pay legislation. See generally Pay Equity Act, R.S.Q. 2010, c. E-12.001 (Can.);
DISKRIMINERINGSLAG (Svensk författningssamling [SFS] 2008:567) (Swed.).
187
R.S.Q. 2010, c. E-12.001, § 50 (Can.) (requiring employers to make pay equity plans); 3
ch. 11 § DISKRIMINERINGSLAG (requiring employers to make action plans). Sweden and
Québec’s equal pay acts have four similar steps. First, both must identify job classes as
primarily male or female and determine if the differences are sex related. R.S.Q. 2010, c. E12.001, § 53 (Can.) (requiring identification of predominately male and female jobs); 3 ch. 10
§ DISKRIMINERINGSLAG (requiring the assessment of male and female jobs). Second, both
must develop a method to determine the value of different job classes, including, but not
limited to, the examination of knowledge, skills, responsibility, effort, and work
environment. R.S.Q. 2010, c. E-12.001, § 57 (Can.) (listing the factors that must be taken into
consideration for value determination); 3 ch. 10 § DISKRIMINERINGSLAG (explaining how
equal value is to be determined). Third, both set forth the designated method to evaluate
job classes, determine equal work among those job classes, and calculate any subsequent
wage disparities. R.S.Q. 2010, c. E-12.001, § 59 (Can.) (evaluating similar jobs using predetermined methods of equal value); 3 ch. 10 § DISKRIMINERINGSLAG (evaluating male and
female jobs using the employer’s criteria of equal value). Fourth, both mandate that
employers make a plan that estimates the cost and time necessary to make the appropriate
compensation adjustments. R.S.Q. 2010, c. E-12.001, § 69 (Can.) (determining payment
adjustment conditions); 3 ch. 11 § DISKRIMINERINGSLAG (discussing the time frame and
costs for making wage adjustments).
188
See PAY EQUITY TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, supra note 21, at 116–18 (discussing the
advantages of flexible provisions in pay equity legislation).
189
See R.S.Q. 2010, c. E-12.001, § 57 (Can.) (listing factors that an employer may take into
account when making a value determination); 3 ch. 2 § DISKRIMINERINGSLAG (allowing
employers to determine what constitutes equal value); PAY EQUITY TASK FORCE FINAL
REPORT, supra note 21, at 118 (noting that evaluation method requirements are fairly
limited).
190
See R.S.Q. 2010, c. E-12.001, § 57 (Can.) (“The value determination method must take
the following factors into account in respect of each job class: (1) required qualifications;
(2) responsibilities; (3) effort required; (4) the conditions under which the work is
performed.”) (emphasis added).
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legislation merely suggests standards “such as” knowledge and skills,
responsibility, effort, and working conditions to determine the value of
job classes.191 Regardless, using the language “such as” instead of
“must” in pay equity legislation provides employers with the deference
to determine what is considered equal value within the workplace.192
Québec’s and Sweden’s implementation requirements are feasible
because the onus on the employer is dependent on the number of
employees.193 Undoubtedly, there are economic costs associated with the
implementation of pay equity laws that are passed onto the employer,
but Sweden eases the economic burden by requiring a minimum
threshold of twenty-five employees to trigger the need for a pay equity
action plan.194 Likewise, Québec does not require a formal pay equity
action plan unless the employer has fifty employees; however,
employers with less than fifty employees are still required to
independently make appropriate adjustments in compensation.195 The
higher the number of employees equates to a higher risk of wage
inequality; thus, Québec requires a pay equity committee, representing
both the employees and the employer, to establish a pay equity plan if
there are over one hundred employees.196
A minor difference between the Canadian and Swedish pay equity
plans is the time frame in which employers must assess and alter their

See 3 ch. 2 § DISKRIMINERINGSLAG (“The assessment of the requirements of the work is
to take into account criteria such as knowledge and skills, responsibility and effort. In
assessing the nature of the work, particular account is to be taken of working conditions.”);
see also R.S.Q. 2010, c. E-12.001, § 57 (Can.) (“The value determination method must take the
following factors into account in respect of each job class: (1) required qualifications; (2)
responsibilities; (3) effort required; (4) the conditions under which the work is performed.”)
(emphasis added).
192
3 ch. 2 § DISKRIMINERINGSLAG.
193
R.S.Q. 2010, c. E-12.001, §§ 4, 10, 16 (Can.) (discussing how the number of employees
impacts employers’ pay equity plans); see PAY EQUITY TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, supra
note 21, at 116 (discussing Ontario’s legislation as the first to apply to the private sector).
Ontario’s equal pay laws allow for implementation flexibility dependent on the size of the
public organization. Id. The report notes that overly flexible criteria, while advantageous,
may also create implementation confusion. Id.
194
3 ch. 11 § DISKRIMINERINGSLAG.
195
R.S.Q. 2010, c. E-12.001, § 34 (Can.). The employer must still provide the same
remuneration to employees in predominately female and male job classes, and that process
cannot discriminate on the basis of gender. Id. An employer with fifty to one hundred
employees must develop pay equity plans, but are not required to have committees. Id.
§ 31.
196
Id. §§ 10, 16. The pay equity committee is responsible for the development of the
establishment’s pay equity plan. Id. § 21.1. See Chicha, supra note 26, at 13 (analyzing
company size requirements to determine how much compliance deference the employer
should receive).
191
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pay practices.197 Under the Swedish system, a pay action plan must be
implemented within three years, which allows employers sufficient time
to make authentic changes.198 Québec, however, has a four year window
for implementation, which allows for an elongated noncompliance
period.199 Canada’s and Sweden’s equal pay acts, in addition to
mandating pay equity plans, establish government commissions to
enforce compliance with their legislation.200
2.

Comparing Governmental Oversight

Although a plaintiff may bring an EPA private suit without
involving the EEOC, the EEOC can serve as a mechanism for
enforcement like Sweden’s Discrimination Board and Ontario’s PEC.201
The EEOC is comparable to the Ontario PEC, in that it collects
employment data from employers and investigates claims.202 The EEOC
also has the authority to investigate allegations of sex discrimination
and, upon finding a violation, has the power to file a lawsuit on behalf of
an individual.203 The difference between the EEOC, the PEC, and the
Discrimination Board is the adjudication procedures.204 Sweden’s and
Canada’s adjudication is handled as part of their governmental oversight
commissions, whereas the EEOC must seek enforcement through the
federal court system.205
Similar to Sweden’s Discrimination Board, the EEOC is tasked with
the enforcement of many anti-discrimination laws.206 However, even
with the additional enforcement responsibilities, the EEOC has not

R.S.Q. 2010, c. E-12.001, § 37 (Can.); 3 ch. 11 § DISKRIMINERINGSLAG.
3 ch. 11 § DISKRIMINERINGSLAG. The action plan is based on the goal of implementing
the necessary adjustment as soon as possible. Id.
199
R.S.Q. 2010, c. E-12.001, § 37 (Can.).
200
See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing the benefits of active governmental oversight).
201
See supra text accompanying note 38 (explaining the administrative procedures for an
EPA claim).
202
See supra text accompanying note 69 (noting employers must submit gender, race, and
job categories to the EEOC).
203
See Overview, supra note 65 (describing the EEOC’s process for handling claims). The
EEOC is not required to file lawsuits in every case it finds discrimination. Id.
204
See supra Part II.A.2 (examining the EEOC’s enforcement provisions); supra Part II.C.1
(examining Ontario’s enforcement provisions); supra Part II.C.2 (analyzing Sweden’s
enforcement practices).
205
See supra text accompany notes 71–74 (exploring public action taken by the EEOC and
the relief available to the employee).
206
See supra text accompanying note 65 (discussing the EEOC’s enforcement of all federal
antidiscrimination legislation); supra text accompanying note 115 (noting the consolidation
of Sweden’s anti-discrimination laws into the Discrimination Act).
197
198
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received additional funding.207
Consequently, there has been a
decreasing trend in the number of EPA lawsuits filed by the EEOC.208 In
2001, the EEOC filed fourteen EPA cases and, in 2008, the agency filed
zero.209 Facing these odds, plaintiffs still opt to bring their grievances to
the attention of the EEOC, because, even with limited resources, the
EEOC has a larger litigation department than a private law firm and a
better rate of success.210
Canada’s and Sweden’s proactive equal pay laws move away from
the confrontational complaint-based approach to a model that fosters
cooperation within the organization.211 The proactive model has been
championed as the most advanced approach to remedying wage
disparity because of its comprehensive pay equity action plan, and the
United States should strive to adopt similar provisions.212
IV. CONTRIBUTION
Congress’s legislative attempts to remedy wage disparity with the
PFA and FPA only target the EPA’s substantially equal standard and the
any factor other than sex affirmative defense.213 These Acts may
improve the litigation process by codifying the pragmatic approach and
bona fide factor requirement, but they do not take substantial preventive
measures to address the wage gap.214 The proactive model curtails the
systemic problem by placing an affirmative responsibility on the
employer to ensure fair pay practices, thereby preventing wage disparity
and litigation.215 Additionally, this approach invests the employer in the
pay practices and relieves the employee of the responsibility of

207
See U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, supra note 32 (stating the EEOC is
responsible for enforcement of the EPA, Title VII, the Age Discrimination Act of 1967
(“ADA”), and Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990); Kathryn Moss et al.,
supra note 66, at 6 (explaining how the EEOC, since 1964, has continued to take on statutory
obligations without obtaining additional funds).
208
See Eisenberg, supra note 12, at 36 (illustrating the number of EPA cases filed by the
EEOC in recent years).
209
Id.
210
Id. The author explains that appellate plaintiffs represented by the EEOC won
seventy-three percent of the time compared to private plaintiffs who won only forty-four
percent of the time. Id.
211
See PAY EQUITY TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, supra note 21, at 111 (explaining that the
proactive model supports cooperation over confrontation).
212
See infra Part IV (discussing an amendment to the EPA incorporating provisions from
Canada’s and Sweden’s pay equity legislation).
213
See supra Part III.A.3 (examining Congress’s legislative proposals).
214
Id.
215
See supra Part III.B (examining the benefits of the proactive model).
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addressing pay equity.216 Amendments must be made to 29 U.S.C.
§ 206—the EPA—under a new subsection (h), in order to remedy the
wage disparity.217
First, § 206 must be amended to indicate the mission of the proactive
changes.218 Second, § 206 must require the employer to conduct a survey
every three years that analyzes pay discrepancies.219 Third, as a result of
that survey, § 206 must require employers to develop pay equity action
plans.220 Last, § 206 must mandate that employers submit their surveys
and pay equity action plans to the EEOC.221
Proposed Amendment to 29 USC § 206(h)222
1. Employers and employees shall endeavor to equalize and
prevent differences in wages between women and men who
perform work which is regarded as equal or of equal value.223
2. To prevent unwarranted pay differentials and to remedy
current pay differentials, the employer with over one hundred
employees shall, within the framework of its operations,
conduct a survey every three years that includes an analysis of
its pay practices and determine whether differences can be
attributed to sex.224
3. As a result of the survey, those employers are to develop a
pay equity action plan, which includes the following
obligations:225

216
See id. (discussing an employer’s mandated responsibility to maintain equal pay
practices). Contra supra note 179 and accompanying text (noting the EPA’s absence of any
employer obligation to maintain equal pay practices).
217
See infra text accompanying notes 222–31 (creating a new amendment to the EPA).
218
See infra text accompanying note 223 (addressing joint cooperation between employers
and employees to address wage inequality).
219
See infra text accompanying note 224 (noting the requirement of a pay survey).
220
See infra text accompanying notes 225–29 (listing the requirement of the pay equity
action plan).
221
See infra text accompanying note 230 (providing the enforcement provision of the Act).
222
The Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, § 3, 77 Stat. 56, 56–57 (1963) (codified
and amended at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2006)). Note that 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2006) currently
only goes up to (g). This proposal is the contribution of the author.
223
This section of the proposed amendment was modeled after Sweden’s Discrimination
Act. See 1 ch. 1 § DISKRIMINERINGSLAG (Svensk författningssamling [SFS] 2008:567) (Swed.)
(stating the purpose to equalize wages and prevent future pay inequality).
224
This section of the proposed amendment was modeled after Sweden’s Discrimination
Act. See 3 ch. 10 § DISKRIMINERINGSLAG (discussing the requirement of a survey).
225
This section of the proposed amendment was modeled after Sweden’s Discrimination
Act. See id. at 3 ch. 11 § DISKRIMINERINGSLAG (stating that a pay equity plan is to be
developed after the survey).
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a) Identify predominately male and female jobs.
Predominately held jobs are those occupations where sixty
percent or more is maintained by one sex.226
b) Develop a method to determine equal value within
the establishment, including, but not limited to, equal
effort, responsibility, skills, and working conditions.227
c) Apply the method to predominately male and female
classes to evaluate the differences in compensation and
assess whether existing pay differences are directly related
to sex.
Calculate any differences in wage
discrimination.228
d) Implementation of the action plan will not take more
than three years. The EEOC, provided with additional
funding, will be tasked with oversight and enforcement of
the action plans following rulemaking procedures already
in place.229
4. Employers then shall submit a report including their
survey and action plan to remedy pay inequality to the
EEOC.230 Failure to submit a report will result in financial
penalties ranging from $50,000-$100,000 and doubled for
repeat offenders.231
Commentary
The four-part amendments to § 206 will effectively allocate
responsibility to the employer to ensure equal pay for those jobs of equal
value. Adopting a mission statement makes clear to both employees and
employers that they are responsible for pay equity practices and it

226
This section of the proposed amendment was modeled after Québec’s Pay Equity Act.
See R.S.Q. 2010, c. E-12.001, §§ 53–55 (Can.) (discussing the identification of predominately
male and female jobs).
227
This section of the proposed amendment was modeled after Québec’s Pay Equity Act.
See id. §§ 56–58 (determining the value of job classes).
228
This section of the proposed amendment was modeled after Québec’s Pay Equity Act.
See id. § 59 (requiring a committee or employer to determine the new value of jobs to assess
equal value among the predominately male and female jobs).
229
This section of the proposed amendment was modeled after Québec’s Pay Equity Act.
See id. § 70 (discussing the implementation of higher wages).
230
The specifics as to how the EEOC handles and enforces these new requirements is
beyond the scope of this Note.
231
This specifies the amount the EEOC can fine an establishment for a violation modeled
after Québec’s and Ontario’s Pay Equity Act. See R.S.Q. 2010, c. E-12.001, § 115 (Can.)
(providing financial penalties for failure to act); Pay Equity Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.7, § 26
(Can.) (stating the financial penalty for failure to comply).
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fosters bilateral cooperation.232 This statement will set the tone as one of
cooperation instead of confrontation. Requiring an employer of over one
hundred employees to conduct a survey every three years will ensure a
serious examination of pay practices to determine if pay differentials can
be attributed to sex.233 One hundred employees is a large enough sample
to make both meaningful comparisons between job classes and
implementation worth the economic costs.
Currently, the EPA does not require employers to take any
reviewable initiatives for addressing wage disparity within their
establishments.234 Thus, the most extensive and crucial part of the
amendment is the creation of the pay equity action plan that identifies
pay disparities, develops a method to determine equal value, applies
that method to predominately male and female jobs, and implements the
change in wages over the course of three years.235 The adoption of the
pay equity action plan creates a comprehensive framework while
simultaneously providing employers with flexibility to develop equal
value methods tailored to meet their establishment’s needs. Recognizing
that the EEOC has been underfunded, additional funding must be
allocated to ensure adequate resources are available for administering
pay equity plan oversight. Finally, requiring employers to submit
surveys and pay equity action plans to the EEOC holds them
accountable and effectively creates a database for the EEOC to track
changes in employer pay practices.236 Additionally, the EEOC would
have the power to issue monetary sanctions for noncompliance.237
While the proposed amendment does not address the inherent flaws
of the complaint-based model, it does seek to preempt wage
discrimination altogether by requiring employers to take an active role in
evaluating pay practices.238 The EPA’s complaint-based approach

232
See supra text accompanying note 223 (addressing joint cooperation between
employers and employees).
233
See supra text accompanying note 224 (explaining the employer’s responsibility to
conduct surveys).
234
See supra text accompanying note 179 (noting the EPA does not mandate any
affirmative responsibility on the employer to maintain equal pay within their
establishment).
235
See supra text accompanying notes 225–29 (explaining the requirements of the pay
equity action plan).
236
See supra text accompanying note 230 (requiring employers to submit their surveys
and action plans to the EEOC).
237
See supra text accompanying note 231 (explaining the monetary fines the EEOC may
impose on employers for noncompliance).
238
See supra text accompany notes 224–29 (stating employers must conduct surveys and
develop pay equity action plans in an effort to maintain equal pay within their
establishments).
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provides relief only after there have been instances of pay inequality,
and the FPA and PFA only seek to make that process more effective.239
Although the FPA and PFA would be an authentic change on the EPA’s
disadvantageous framework, 29 U.S.C. § 206(h) needs to be considered
as an additional approach when combating the systematic wage
disparity. This amendment strives to adjust the unequal balance in
responsibility of narrowing the wage gap in conjunction with the EPA’s
existing framework. By allocating some responsibility to the employers,
the proactive model seeks to balance the burden of ameliorating the
wage disparity that currently is shouldered solely by the employee.
V. CONCLUSION
The World Economic Forum reports a correlation between the
growth of a society and the empowerment of its women.240 Equal pay
for equal work is arguably the foundation of women’s empowerment.241
While the EPA was novel when enacted in 1963, in the twenty-first
century it currently serves as merely a provincial remedy for the
professional woman. Although Congress has made attempts to address
major obstacles in current law, these legislative proposals neglect to
address the overarching dilemma of the complaint-based model. The
prosaic complaint-based model fails to mandate preventative measures
to be taken by the employer to close the wage gap. Although Mika
Brzezinski is right that women need to know their value and learn to ask
for it, there also needs to be an introduction of a legal framework that
allocates some of that responsibility on the employers. The systematic
problem—the pay gap—requires a systematic solution.
239
See supra Part III.A.3 (explaining how the FPA and PFA address the disadvantageous
framework of the EPA).
240
See AUGUSTO LOPEZ-CLAROS & SAADIA ZAHIDI, WOMEN’S EMPOWERMENT: MEASURING
THE GLOBAL GENDER GAP, WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM 11 (2005) (explaining the two points
of correlation—the Gender Gap Index ranks and Growth Competitiveness and the Gender
Gap Index and the log of GDP per capita). See also SANDBERG, supra note 6, at 25 (providing
the commencement address at Barnard College, an all-women’s liberal arts school).
You are the promise for a more equal world. . . . And I hope that
you . . . have the ambition to lean in to your career and run the world.
Because the world needs you to change it. Women all around the
world are counting on you. So please ask yourself: What would I do if
I weren’t afraid? And then go do it.
Id. at 25–26.
241
LOPEZ-CLAROS, supra note 240, at 2. The World Economic Forum identified economic
participation, economic opportunity, political empowerment, educational attainment, and
health and well being as the five important dimensions to women’s empowerment. Id.
Economic participation concerns the number of women working and whether they are
being compensated on an equal basis. Id. at 3.
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Requiring employers of a hundred or more employees to conduct a
survey that analyzes their pay practices every three years ensures
employers are aware of pay differentials.242 In addition, employers
would be tasked with creating pay equity action plans that identify pay
disparity among jobs, develop an internal method to determine what is
equal work, apply the method to jobs predominately held by men and
women, and then implement necessary changes within two years.243
After all, “[n]o one should have to dance backward all of their lives.”244
Keiko Lynn Yoshino∗

See supra text accompanying note 224 (proposing a survey requirement).
See supra text accompanying notes 225–29 (proposing a four-step pay equity action
plan).
244
Jill Ruckelshaus, former commissioner on the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights 1980–
1983 and current director of Costco Wholesale Corp., THE GALLOPING BEAVER (Feb. 5,
2006), available at http://thegallopingbeaver.blogspot.com/2006/02/no-one-should-haveto-dance-backward.html.
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